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THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

JOURNAL OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Joint Editors: VICTOR BRANFORD
ALEXANDER FARQUHARSON

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

OBJECTS.

The Sociological Society was founded in 1904, with the object of promoting study and research in sociology, and for this purpose it seeks to co-operate with specialists and workers in all branches of the social sciences, and endeavours to afford a common ground on which they can meet and discuss the various aspects of social phenomena. The Society organises lectures, meetings and research groups with a view to carrying out this object.

MONTHLY MEETINGS.

THROUGHOUT the autumn, winter and spring terms monthly meetings are held, at which addresses are given, followed by discussions. Those who have addressed the Society's meetings during the past year include Mr. H. J. Laski (on "The Future of Parliamentary Government"), the Hon. Mr. Srinivasa Bastri (on "The Non-Co-operation Movement"), Dr. R. W. Seton Watson (on "The Successors of Austria-Hungary: some of their Problems"), Mr. George Russell ("A.E.") (on "Ireland Past and Future"), and Mr. G. K. Chesterton (on "The Return of the Gods").

COURSES OF LECTURES.

In addition to the monthly meetings, courses of lectures on special aspects of sociological problems are given by those who have been engaged on research work. During the Autumn Term, 1921, Mr. Harold J. E. Peake has given a course on "The Evolution of the English Village Community."

RESEARCH GROUPS.

TWO Research Groups have been organised by the Sociological Society. One of these, under the chairmanship of Mr. Alexander Farguharson, is studying the works of the French School of Sociology, "La Science Sociale." The Group has completed a co-operative translation of Mons. Demolins' work, "Comment la Route crée le Type Social." The second Research Group, which has Social Psychology for its field (Chairman, Mr. A. F. Shand), is making a special study of the Family, from primitive to modern times. These Research Groups hold fortnightly meetings, for study and discussion.

THE CIVIC SURVEY COMMITTEE.

The Civic Survey Committee of the Sociological Society has accumulated a valuable collection of maps and plans of cities and regions, with literature bearing on these, which can be consulted at Leplay House.

MEMBERSHIP AND ASSOCIATESHIP.

MEMBERSHIP and Associateship of the Sociological Society is open to all those interested in the aims of the Society. The annual subscription for membership is now £3 2s. 6d.

The annual subscription for Associateship is 10s. This subscription does not entitle Associates to become Members of the Society's Council, to vote at the business meetings, or to receive the *Sociological Review*.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

The headquarters of the Society are at Leplay House, 65, Belgrave Road, London, S.W. 1, where a Library and Reading Room are open to members.

ALL enquiries and applications for membership should be made to the Secretary, Miss D. C. Loch, at this address.

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*SCIENCE AND SANCTITY: being suggestions towards a theory of the Day-dreaming and Visioning process.

I. THE SEVERANCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND REVERENCE.

THE delight and awe with which we view an ancient cathedral arise from vast suggestions which here flood the spirit with a profound harmony. This miracle of power and grace, whose floor we tread, is the work of people like ourselves, but of people who had in some deep sense come home. For them, for a brief summer-time, power was at one with grace, science with sanctity. This venerable monument is science all through, and all through it is sanctity; you cannot dis sever their effects nor say that one of them is master. They are fused in a mutual rapture, each triumphantly itself by its union with the other. Together they descend to the rocks and blend with the sunlight and soar into the heavens, to enshrine the soul's converse, of knowledge and reverence, with the community, with nature and with the ideal.

NOT architectural skill alone, and worship only of the unseen, inspire this holy place. It was the flower of all extant knowledge and of every human work and piety, and so of knowledge and devotion alike simple, homely and wonderful, understood and acknowledged by all. From its carvings and imagery you may read a doctrine of the universe, of creation and providence, of history, of society, of good and evil, of the soul and its renewal and destiny, of true and false values, of eternity and the end in which all things have their being, all set, just as they are in life, amid common things of nature, flowers, foliage, beasts comely or comic, grotesque or grim. Figures of great kings and queens, warriors, pontiffs, scholars, abbots, attend in their places, with heroes of constancy, mercy, faith, vision, song and every glorious gift and grace; and cherubim of love and seraphim of knowledge look up in adoration. Birth and school days, apprenticeship and travel,

*The introductory chapter of a forthcoming volume entitled *Science and Sanctity* in the *Making of the Future* series.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

REPORT

The following is a report of the work of the Society during the year 1900-1901. It is a summary of the work of the Society as a whole, and of the work of its various departments.

General Information

The Society was organized on the 15th of January, 1900, at a meeting held at which various resolutions were adopted. The first meeting of the Society was held on the 15th of February, 1900, at which the first business was transacted.

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Financial Statement

The financial statement of the Society for the year 1900-1901 shows a total income of \$100.00, and a total expenditure of \$100.00. The balance on hand at the end of the year was \$100.00.

Membership

The total membership of the Society for the year 1900-1901 was 100. The total membership of the Society for the year 1900-1901 was 100.

Publications

The Society has published a number of publications during the year 1900-1901. These publications are as follows:

The first publication of the Society was the "Report of the Society for the year 1900-1901." This report was published in the month of January, 1901.

Resolutions

The following are the resolutions of the Society for the year 1900-1901. These resolutions were adopted at the meeting of the Society held on the 15th of February, 1900.

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crafts and occupations, the yearly seasons, marriage and family life, old age and death are consecrated in stone and wood, enshrined in glass and metal, for the flowing generations. The social bonds of justice and wise rule, loyalty, obedience and charity, the due humility of the great and the inalienable dignity of the poor, are displayed in a grand simplicity. Here is the chapel of the smiths, this was the chapel of the leather-workers. Here was the altar of the tailors, there the shrine of the haberdashers. The whole universe of man's life was intelligently one, that is synthetised and imaged ; and thus through idealism and its emotion, sanctified. Knowledge then was one and piety was one, just as together they were one ; and regulated by one end, a sense and intimation, even at times a vision, of the happiest and noblest life, so that men understood and worked together wonderfully, as in making this mystery of stone.

TO-DAY the thing is visibly a shell, a fossil ; or, at best, a being of broken spirit and intermittent life, attached to the throbbing heart of its city, by but tenuous threads of tissue. Its own life could not, or (more truly) did not last. Flowers and cathedrals pass ; it seems we have no abiding city. Both knowledge and piety have since suffered fearful trials, continuing to this day, that in the end each may be humbler, more faithful and more valiant. If they had enlarged together they would have given to the world inestimable benefits ; but in fact they parted ; and their alienation led to the confusion and darkness of the current age. Yet their unity, which is as the unity of lovers, is for ever deeper than difference or even than sameness ; and their reunion, if not inevitable, is certainly their only fulfilment. For neither is truly free except in the other.

MEANWHILE, to the misery of the whole realm, the royal pair are estranged, dwelling far apart. The Prince, enormously increasing his dominions, fame and wealth, and lending himself to every ambitious mistress, has given his people power but not liberty, splendour but not satisfaction, tools, weapons, gold, but not homes nor bread ; while the Queen of all loveliness, embowered in dreams and memories, lives secluded in a world of wistful memory and romantic fantasy. Thus these two majesties have fallen into much dishonour ; and though some follow him, and some her, the mass of the people have come to care not a straw for either. So certitude, faith, reverence and hope have withered ; and with these even the knowledge-apples have grown bitter, and the whole body politic falls into decay.

WHERE lies the fault ? Undoubtedly it lies in this estrangement ; and chiefly in the pride of Prince and Queen alike, which against their old world love maintains a bitter separation. He worships his own power and liberty ; she her own purity ; until the power becomes barbarism and the grace a posture. How shall they come together ?

How regain the marriage which will renew the realm? Only by being Prince and Queen indeed, and so in everything the servants of the people. As they return to that service, wherein lies all their health and sanity, beauty shall rise again in power throughout the land and power be clothed in grace and beauty.

WE cannot wonder that many, weary of his extravagancies and of her ineptitudes, and warned by accumulated calamity, are vowed to bring this truant pair together. A revolutionary spirit is abroad, not at all united as to the measures to be taken, but at times quite clear as to the end in view. This is the reunion of secular knowledge, practice and administration, with religious devotion to ideals of grace and other supreme values. It is the reconciliation of Science and Sanctity.

Now to many this project undoubtedly appears as fantastic as if he spoke of re-arranging the heavens so as to place Orion upon the Plough and make a new glittering pattern of the two. And it is true that in our mental sky are great constellations both of science and religion, diagrams of fact and images of worth, and each full of sublime historic systems of which no one but a fool or a cynic can think except with reverence. There they abide, for ever a part of the fabric of history, of society, and of our active or latent consciousness. But they are not immutable. They are subject to incessant secular change. They had their origin in human life, and all who live to-day, whether they will or no, are affecting these constellations of ideas, images, ideals. It is fortunately true that man cannot lay ephemeral hands on the stupendous starry monuments of antique science and sanctity, and adjust them to his crude and momentary fancy. But he can identify himself with the creative and unifying, and therefore "holy" spirit of life, which in societies of all time has been the fount of quest and aspiration. Life in evolution is greater than any of its past products. Clean, clear, original thought is more vital than any of its systems. Reverence and love are more venerable and lovely than any finite objects, so that the supreme images are but images of these. Though we may not always be able to unite diagrams and images, we can each one of us ever return to the unity of life. For science and sanctity spring together from the one stem of life; life itself is the integral object of their endeavour; and their end is in union to a new and higher life.

THESE two functions, of knowledge and reverence, are inseparable factors in every social development, as well as in all personal experience and education. The sociologist is bound to take account of their relations to one another and to the welfare of civilisation, and to consider how they may be integrated to that end. He is compelled to make studies (such as are contained in this essay) in anticipation of, even preparation for, the clearer knowledge and the steadier vision of a later day.

As to where such studies may conveniently begin and how proceed, wide limits are permissible within the unity of life, individual and social, contemporary and historic. Shall we take for a start-point the actual working, everyday cult of the plain-man who has his being in each of us? If so, then much might be said for beginning with a study of that utilitarian doctrine which has so largely served the Industrial Age as a discipline of life. True it is that the *word utilitarianism* has all but dropped out of ordinary usage and been relegated to learned discussion; yet does not its substance remain the prevalent mode of life-guidance, as yet, even in our post-war days? Of a certainty that is true in the realms of business and hardly less so in politics; for do not business-men and politicians still openly boast of being "practical" in all things, sure sign and badge of the utilitarian cult. This doctrine affirms that the strength and right direction of affairs lie in power, mastery and intellect, and not in faith and worship, love and pity, beauty and joy. It regards these spiritual influences not as the mighty, serene forces that they are, "the ministers of grace defending us," a world invisible, yet whose effects we see and are able to count on, but only as at best an incidental parallelism, a music of fancy and emotion which may accompany the actual play yet take little or no direct part in it. This view of life postulates self-interest as the bedrock principle upon which we have to build. A theory so blind and—in outcome—dishonest as this, so manifestly less the work of detached observation than of half-conscious intention, is at bottom plainly no more than the dogmatic defence of an existing social system, say rather, an economic situation, the unsystematised confusion of the industrial age.

YET revolutionary forces, in attempting to replace that system by what they conceive to be a better, have too often taken over (even sometimes in an aggravated form) the "materialistic" theory, on the one side, of mechanism and its gains, on the other, of self-interest and pecuniary values; so that any constructive efforts they may make are unhappily vitiated by such implicit belittling of the spiritual factor. Yet this soul-destroying and city-destroying error, this barren utilitarian theory—whether in "capitalistic" or "socialistic" form here matters little—is happily beginning to relax its hold on the popular mind. It is slowly but surely receding into the darkness to which, like Bunyan's "man with the muckrake," it properly belongs; and an increasing number understand that the spiritual elements of life must once more play their parts, and moreover throughout the whole range of social activity. Yet the tortures of soul and the vagaries of mind inflicted on mankind during the dominance of the utilitarian habit of mind have far from ceased. And so long as these continue there must needs be widespread denial or perversion of the essentials of the "religious" office; for assuredly the finest endeavours of every religion worth the

name have been directed to the awakening of the inner life and adjusting the outer thereto.

II. THE WIDENING RANGE OF SCIENCE.

MODERN SCIENCE, though not the offspring of utilitarianism, has nevertheless been deeply penetrated by its influence during a century of formative growth. The bias of tendency thus acquired in the body of scientific knowledge, and in the corresponding habit of mind, has to be kept constantly in view, in any endeavour to estimate the character, appraise the worth and forecast the future development of modern science. To correct that bias and to replace its defects by a corresponding set of qualities, various movements are in progress throughout the field of science. The consequent reshaping of ideas and re-orienting of outlook amongst scientific workers is one of the marked features of our times.

CURRENT movements towards enlightenment are indeed reflected nowhere more clearly than in the changed aspect which has come over modern scientific ideas. These have entered on a phase of rapid and even startling development, as when some plant, after growing for many years into comely shape, throws up at last the long expected stem which is to bear the flowers. These changes in science reveal a new outlook and new ideals, such as dawn on youth in adolescence; and in their case, as in these, we must ascribe the transformation to a meaning inherent from the beginning, though long undisclosed. Our minds are formed by habitual analogies, whose influence is so complete as to be chiefly unconscious; and the same is true of successive periods in history. The development of these analogies, from the more abstract to the more concrete, is, in no small measure, the development of scientific thought. This, to be sure, depends also in large degree upon the manner of our social life and institutions; for, as social observers increasingly recognise, man's way of thinking is profoundly influenced by the objects of his professional interest. The predominant interest and outlook of each period, generation, personality, reflect themselves upon other interests and outlooks of the same period, generation, personality by various mental processes of which one is "analogy." If it is not an individual but a group or community that is concerned, a characteristic uniformity of mind is developed for which some sociologists use the term *consensus*, and others the phrase *psychic diapason*.

Now enquiring into the *consensus*, or *psychic diapason* of the "scientific mind" in its recent movements and social adaptations, what do we find? We find that this so-called scientific mind has almost insensibly moved, within recent decades, from analogies of mechanics to analogies of life and development, and is thus recovering a far richer and more primitive vein of truth. For instance, fifty years ago

they spoke of "moulding," "filling" and "polishing" the mind of a child; to-day we think of it rather as a beautiful, if wayward plant to be tended. But the process does not stop at this point. The enrichment of the forms of thought, as for instance by the conceptions of evolution and bionomics, opens new fields for orderly observation, and these in turn react on those forms and analogies. Thus, we cannot study a city, or a populous river valley as the living thing which it really is, without acquiring a richer conception of life and its evolution. Just as, without forgetting the mechanical nature of things, we come to see their livingness as well; so, without forgetting vegetal and animal functions, whether of organism or of city, we begin to perceive spiritual functions latent or patent throughout the drama of evolution, and are able to study their gradual liberation to ever completer expression. Spiritual analogies may not replace, but will certainly gloriously illumine, the vitalist analogies of our present phase. The child-mind is more than a plant to be tended; so that the vegetal analogy, though not so bad as the mechanical, has still defects and practical danger. The city is indeed like a coral reef or an ant-hill, but is also becoming aware that its vocation is to be a living work of art, like our cathedral when alive. And we are not far from understanding the flower garden as a chorus of love and joy and sacrifice, just as lovers, painters and poets find it.

By applying to human societies well-tried methods of observation and interpretation, sociology is gradually unveiling a sublime unity in place of a multitude of more or less disconnected sciences and interests, and so is gradually revealing the elements of a practical art which we may hope will be the highest and most potent of all. For the same reason it affords a measure by which we may compare and judge the ideal and practical systems of the past. Yet a sound attitude towards these newer modes and moods of science must be critical as well as appreciative. Nothing but the blindness of partisanship could ignore, in modern science, its own confusions, and its inheritance of classical sophistries, mediæval formalisms, renaissance separatisms, utilitarian negations. To be sure its great and growing edifice is seen rising above these limitations and transcending them in many ways, notably in biology and anthropology, in psychology and sociology. Looking at science more particularly on its humanist frontiers, we observe it lifting itself far above the old utilitarian plane. Indeed, it takes all human interests as its province, and is itself shaped by these, and most of all by the spiritual interests, of which knowledge is but one. It therefore comes inevitably to review a world of matters which in the past have been viewed almost exclusively from the standpoint of religion. Sociology (estimating this science, to be sure, more by its tendencies than by its performances so far) has its own vision or theory of these; and on the other hand religion, often using archaic

scientific conceptions, has its theory also; and the two theories do not in fact coincide. They are not necessarily on that account in contradiction, any more than a map on one projection contradicts a map of the same region drawn on another projection. We have no desire to minimise the discrepancy, which, however, is for the most part ignorantly exaggerated. Reasoned faith is no enemy to faithful reason. But the important point is that while theory is the essence of science, and doubtless also of theology, it is not the essence of religion. The essence of religion is sanctity, that is to say, love—an uplooking love which develops into a world of graces, intuitions and appreciations.

You do not expect a botanist to study plants and yet to take no notice of their flowers, on the ground that these are the special interest of the florist. No more can you expect the student of human societies, or of life-in-evolution, to ignore that flaming splendour which is literally their flower and final interpretation—personalities, and even communities, living a life of love and joy and sacrifice, yet infinitely various and beautiful, as flowers are. Sanctity has other aspects also, but this is central. It is the end of evolution, the characteristic flowering of the tree of life. If science is not to take account of the spiritual element in living things, nor of the spiritual intention and consummation of evolution, it must deny its own nature and go back from the pursuit of truth. Its own proper development has brought it to an inevitable appreciation of sanctity.

BUT this is only one factor in the reunion which we desire and foresee. The other is as follows. In the crowning form of sociology (again taken rather prospectively than actually) science has come to such a development and to such responsibilities that it requires, even for its own theoretic and practical purposes, progressive inspiration by the highest intuitions, such as those of poet, saint, seer, and artist. Their perception and estimation of values are all-important in the discovery of truth. The prophets and seers of old were the sociologists of their time. To-day their successors, bending to a heavier burden of evil and facing more complex issues, have every need of such insight and illumination as current sociology can yield. The professed sociologist on his part can at least try and then try again to see with the eye of the artist, think with the mind of the seer, feel with the heart of the saint. In the degree of his success in these three exercises of the spirit, the sociologist may hope to enjoy their richest fruit of inspiration. And that maybe is best gathered in the poet's garden of vision. Yet nothing of the logic of science need be abated as it grows and develops into a logic of life. By all these aids we may come to know the social process and its relation to mind and spirit, with a finer discernment, an intenser realism, a juster valuation. Less faulty then on the side of knowledge at least may the partnership of science and sanctity become.

III. VISION AND ITS VERIFIABILITY.

A DAY must surely arrive when biologist, psychologist and sociologist, all acting in concert, will gain courage and competence to unveil the unity of life in all its characteristic aspects. The nuptials of science and sanctity will ensue as spring follows winter in the seasonal rhythm. But there are, to be sure, many preliminaries to this lifting of the veil of Isis. One of them is the task of rescuing the word "vision" from its present confusion, abuse, neglect and discredit. Mention this word in any gathering of people representatively miscellaneous and observe their reactions. Those of religious and mystical tendency will perhaps some of them imagine diaphanous beings floating in the void. To the cultivated man of leisure it may recall the fleeting caprice of postprandial day-dreams. To the critical mind it may suggest a gas-bag vomiting streams of "hot air." Many business men and too many cultivators of social studies are alike in that "vision" conveys to them probably no imagery whatever, and very little, if any, meaning, so the word is tabu in the jargon of the one and the patter of the other. For the medical man it means hallucination. The physical scientist, with the defects and the qualities of his metier, seizes on the word vision and adapts it to his limited purpose of technical usage. He reserves it for an analysis of the functions of eye, nerve and brain in seeing external things. But this is to emasculate the word by an excision which cuts off one part for an exclusively material object and casts the other part adrift. If in all this bewilderment the plain man has come to treat the visionary as compact of illusion, it can hardly be counted against him.

In a mood of enquiry, and even with promptings to amendment, the plain-man might turn to the encyclopædias. But his perplexities would perhaps be more increased than diminished. Standard works like the BRITANNICA have set a fashion which is followed in minor works. The 29 columns of the BRITANNICA under the rubric *Vision*, are (in the eleventh edition), wholly devoted to an account of how we see external objects. In so far as lesser encyclopædias depart from this model, it is to note that there are states of mental disease in which we think we see things that don't exist. In other words the only form of inner vision as yet recognised by modern encyclopædists is hallucination, or so it appears. And the philosophers are in little better case. Their largest specialised encyclopædia outdoes the BRITANNICA. It gives 70 columns to *Vision*, defined, analysed, elaborated, as "the sense whose organ is the eye, whose stimulus is light, and whose nerve is the opticus." The whole 70 columns do not appear to contain a single word which suggests an inner power to create visions of life in its fulfilment and perfection. Of this creative latency there is some recognition in an older and smaller encyclopædia of philosophy,

now presumably out of date. Under the heading "Imagination (religious)" it quotes Ruskin as follows:—

"THE first and noblest use of imagination is to enable us to bring sensibly to our sight, the things which are recorded as belonging to our future state or as invisibly surrounding us in this. It is given to us that we may imagine the cloud of witnesses in heaven and earth, and see now present the souls of the righteous waiting for us; that we may conceive the great army of the inhabitants of heaven and discover amongst them those that we most desire to be with for ever; it is given to us that we may be able to vision forth the ministry of angels beside us, and see the chariots of fire in the mountains that gird us around; but above all to call up the scenes and facts in which we are commanded to believe, and be present as if in the body at every recorded event of the history of the Redeemer."

PASSING from encyclopædias to dictionaries, the enquirer would doubtless be confirmed in his impression that vision in any other sense than that of external sight is but a product either of reverie, or fancy or of "apparitions," whatever they may be. In illustration of the correct use of the word as a child of fancy, the CENTURY DICTIONARY quotes Macaulay's "visions of dominion and glory rose before him." The more learned and systematic LAROUSSE cites recent literary authorities, whose pronouncements seem not only to justify but to explain the modern rejection of older notions about the reality of inner vision. One of these authorities observes that people have become bored and even annoyed by the wearisome sameness running through all the visions of seers old and new. Another sapiently declares "error for error, the agreeable illusions of the poets are preferable to the sad visions of the philosophers." And a third affirms with pompous conviction that we moderns would be foolish indeed if we were persuaded to "take the visions of the sick brain for the clear views of science."

OF three religious encyclopædias, the Jewish, strange to say, has no article on *vision*; the Protestant one characteristically leaps from *visigoths* to *vitalism*, passing over *vision* without even a nod on the way. The Catholic encyclopædia, however, makes plain the contrast between ancient and modern notions on this subject. A longish article is devoted mainly to the value of visions in enhancing life by guiding its impulses and desires towards spiritual fulfilment. Here the issue is presented as a practical one. People *do* have inner "visions," though by no means always presented as imagery. Very often they surge into consciousness as a sense of another presence. Thus St. Teresa is quoted: "I have rarely perceived the Devil under any form, but he has often appeared to me without one." "Under such circumstances," continues St. Teresa, "the soul conceives the object and

feels whence it is, more clearly than if it saw it—it is like feeling someone in a dark place." Since then visions arise in the inner life, either as imagery or as an emotion of imagery, the practical question is this: are they of evil or of good import? Do they come from above or below, from God or from the Devil? The encyclopædic answer is that each one has to determine this issue for himself by the application of certain tests. He must value the aroused impulses and desires by their personal reactions. Do the visions promote such graces and perfections as peace of soul, divine love, inclination towards the ideals of righteousness? In short, does the coming of the vision mean that we are offered an ideal or a temptation? By way of illustrating both the difficulties of discovering whether visions are divine or demonic in origin and also how definite knowledge of fact and history must be applied to their testing, the following narrative is given. There appeared one day to St. Martin a dazzling light. From its effulgence emerged a young man clad in royal raiment, his head encircled by a diadem. A voice spoke and the beautiful youth said, "I am your Christ." From St. Martin came no reply. The youth protested, "Martin, why dost thou hesitate to believe when thou seest me?" Then upspoke the saint: "The Lord did not say he would return in purple raiment and adorned with a crown of gold and jewels. I will not recognise my Saviour unless I see Him as He suffered on the cross with pierced hands and feet." Thereupon, its armour of subterfuge pierced, the diabolic phantom vanished, leaving behind an abominable stench. The temptation was vanquished.

IN this story of St. Martin we may see happily combined two aspects of life usually torn asunder in modern times. Between "facts" or knowledge of things, and "values" or perception of the worth of things to personality, recent philosophy has drawn a sharp line. In making that hard and fast dichotomy professed philosophers have followed and reflected a public mind long habituated to divide its contents into watertight compartments. But a mental habit of seeking for vital unity marked the age of St. Martin. For him there was no abstracting of factual knowledge from valuations of worth. Science and Sanctity were at one in his mind. But the point is that it was in and through vision they were made one. Vision was for him a mirror to reflect the image of an ideal reality and at the same time show its factual relation to the detail of this, here, now. We want a word to express this compound quality of inner vision. From the current phrasing of science the word verifiable might be chosen for the purpose. The verifiability, or potency of making to come true, of vision would thus be open to test by simultaneous reference to the outer world of circumstance and the inner world of subjective values. And for proof we should expect a dominant harmony of inner and outer in an ascending mastery of life over matter.

THE great renovators of vision have addressed themselves to this problem of calling forth idealised pictures of fulfilment that can be made to come true. It was present to the mind of Ignatius Loyola in his famous revision of a Benedictine *System of Exercises for the Life of the Spirit*. By that renewal the Catholic Church, more perhaps than by any other means, was enabled to weather the storm of the Reformation and enter upon a growing re-adjustment to modern conditions. The gist of this revision, or so it appears to the lay student, was insistence on a more rigorous application of extant knowledge to the fashioning and the valuing of inner visions. It was not for nothing that Loyola wandered over western Europe in a state of pupilage, putting himself to one university after another in a laborious search for the stuff of an integrated life. The final upshot of his meditations, studies, experiments, can be put simply, as regards the intellectual aspect of vision. To test their validity one must search and examine their "beginning, middle and end." For the psychologist of to-day this dictum of Loyola is the very essence of common-sense procedure. The *beginnings* of vision are in the impressions, experiences, doings, thoughts, impulses, desires of our past and present phases of life; and all these contents of the mind have a definite reference to the facts of our environment and the character of our social inheritance, and a less definite reference to the organic quality of our ancestry. The *end* of vision is in the purpose of life to which it moves us. The *middle* is in the means of realisation to which the vision impels and directs our actions. Interpret it in a modern sense, and this dictum of the first modernist imparts a new significance to his own system of *Spiritual Exercises*. We must attribute to it an intellectual intention as well as an evocatory office. The vision called forth can be made to come true, provided that verifiable elements have previously been systematically presented to the mind and well absorbed into its creative substance. Building on this revised view of spiritual function, the Jesuit Order naturally developed a great new teaching organisation. They made their cardinal contribution to renewal of the Catholic vision, neither as intercessory suppliants like the early Benedictines, nor as preachers like the Friars, but as schoolmasters.

THIS problem of the verifiability of vision was the feature of that age; maybe it is the central problem of life and society and so, of necessity, is or should be the feature of every age, even of every generation. Look back to the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Revolution, Industrial and Political, as successive scenes in a single Drama. In that perspective the formative readjustments of tradition and aspiration fall into intelligible places. Take three instances. Erasmus propounded one scheme of re-adjustment, Luther another, Calvin with his fully reasoned *Institutes*, another. The renewal of vision was central to all three schemes, as to that of Loyola, but with

differences. In respect of imagery within the field of vision, Loyola retained and continued the realist tradition and stressed its verifiability in life. The visions of the other three could be arranged on a scale of imagistic diminuendo with a corresponding crescendo of vagueness as regards verifiability. From Loyola, through Erasmus and Luther to Calvin, does not the imagery of the vision recede progressively towards a position abstracted from the outer circumstance? This tendency to divorce of inner and outer ran its course of adjustment to the dominant situation of each succeeding phase of the modern era.

THE inner vision of Lutheran and Calvinist was dependent on the emotion of the printed word in sacred texts rather than on frankly imaged ideals. By reason of these vaguer sanctities was the Protestant mind doubtless prepared for the more abstract visions of secularised politics. The revolutionary ideal of a polity guided seemingly by the light of reason alone, wherever it may have been originally conceived, was first applied (with a certain coldness of deliberation) in England, and long afterwards incarnated in the impassioned writings of Rousseau, citizen of Geneva, the Protestant Rome. Only then did it kindle to violence the "reds" of the South who, in the heat of summer, thereupon dragged their canon from Marseilles to Paris and made the Great Revolution. But the essentially abstract character of the underlying faith comes out in its historic formula. Who, short of a mathematical magician, could picture so beclouded a phenomenon as "the principles of '89"? The Marxians of '48 saw one face under the red cap; the Communards of '71 a second; the Fabians of the nineties a third; the Bolsheviks of to-day a fourth. Certainly it is natural and right that the features of Liberty and the shade of red in her head-gear should adapt themselves to the ideals of every generation, even of every half generation. But if her sculptors continue to work on the model of '89 they cannot complain if their art is classed as belonging to that hegira of illusory vision. And moreover, all these movements of insurgent politics, as well as their paler reflections in conventional mirrors, seem but as undulations in the larger wave of the speculative impulse in its interplay with the practical. The breaking crest of the main wave may perhaps be discerned, and even timed, by its remote perturbations in the still waters of philosophy. Our suggestion is that the zenith in separation of inner from outer, and consequently the nadir of vision, was touched in the late nineteenth century. It was then that the post-Kantian Germanic philosophy of two rival absolutes, one of "facts" and another of "values," won acceptance in England and America and to some degree elsewhere throughout the Western world. The road to this goal had long been building. We had grown accustomed to sharp cleavages. Capital and labour, town and country, rich and poor, West-end and East-end, business and culture, economics and ethics, industry and art, mind

and body : these are examples of prevalent dichotomies. The times were ripe. The way was prepared. A Philosophy of Duplicity arrived with its stark opposition of Outlook and Inlook.

IV. VISION IN ART, LITERATURE, SCIENCE AND POLITICS.

A YAWNING breach in the unity of life is as fatal to sustained effort of clear thought, deep emotion, high action, as is the boiling of milk to its contained vitamins. And not least sterilizing of the resulting inhibitions has been the reaction on art, prolific parent of visions. Perhaps the most marked of modern defects is in the failure of art, so far, to vision forth something which would stir our whole community with a passion of creative unanimity. This failure is often loosely set down to the divorce of art from religion. But that is a vague statement which conceals more than it discloses. In its beginnings the mischief goes back a long way. You can certainly detect its appearance in the thirteenth century. Dante's *DIVINE COMEDY* was an effort of dawning secular art to recover and re-adjust for his time the cathedral vision of life, already fading to dimness of outline. The test of concrete verifiability he boldly applied by reference to the people and affairs of his own city and country in his own day. Facts of recent history and contemporary life he tried to fit into the perspective of a picture showing the full gamut of life's ideal, as the mediæval theologian saw it, in triumph, sanctity, rapture ; in decay, corruption, agony, dissolution ; in redemption, renewal, re-ascent. Dante's quest was for the vision verifiable composed from data authentic because given alike in science and in sanctity. Of his attainment, let his own words speak. They may tell us more of the psychology of inner vision than can be gleaned from the encyclopædias.

AFTER descending the deepening circles of hell and traversing the realms of purgatory, he begins his ascent to paradise :

" . . . That I no more
May live in blindness . . . "

As he climbs the mount of true vision, his eyes are no longer holden to the perfections of life :

" . . . Looks I beheld,
Where Charity in soft persuasion sat,
Smiles from within and radiance from above,
And in each gesture grace and honour high."

THE vision of these and other perfections and graces is beyond words :

" . . . Oh, speech,
How feeble and how faint art thou
To give conception birth ! "

BUT in memory something of the rapture remains :

" . . . for all the vision dies,
As 'twere away ; and yet the sense of sweet
That sprang from it, still trickles in my heart."

Of the culminating prospect in which an ideal unity was made manifest, he says that :

" . . . whenever
I do but speak of it, my soul dilates
Beyond her proper self."

FROM those two lines we learn something even of the physiology of inner vision seemingly unperceived by the scientist in his laboratory. But that is by the way. Return to the poem and observe, vivid under a cloak of divinity, the human figure that drew Dante up the mount of Paradise. His final apostrophe to Beatrice exhibits a relation of the lover to his beloved, firm in the faith of everyman as a realizable potency of life, verified in countless instances past and present, and therefore given in the nature of things. In other words, Dante's paradisaical vision of Beatrice pictures just that which, circumstances being favourable, every good woman is gifted to do for her man :

" O, Lady ! thou in whom my hopes have rest !
Who for my safety hast not scorned in hell
To leave the traces of thy footsteps marked !
For all mine eyes have seen, I to thy power
And goodness, virtue owe and peace. From slave,
Thou hast to freedom brought me ! and no means
For my deliverance apt, hast left untried."

THAT idealised lady of Florence is the dominant figure in Dante's paradise. But little else of Florence is discoverable there. He saw many of his fellow citizens in purgatory, and still more of them in hell. Indeed the heavenly city is conceived not as a perfected version of Florence but as its antithesis (as though Beatrice in heaven were the very opposite of Beatrice on earth.) On beatific heights his emotion is of escape into a world abstracted from the living city, and so, by contrast, a refuge from its trials, problems, tasks, walled off from sight by alien constructions :

" . . . I who then
From human to divine had passed, from Time
Unto Eternity, and out of Florence
To justice and to truth."

It would seem that in the end Dante relinquished the quest of verifiability in his visioning of life perfected. And that legacy of abandonment has added its baneful influence to the *damnosa hereditas* of secular art and literature. The rise of modern literature and art is an oft told tale. But seldom if ever do its narrators recount the concurrent tragedy of the mediæval city's decay and break up. Those civic members whose buildings were cathedral, town-hall, belfry, guild-house, suffered a loss of integrity, as virtue departed from their mother, the mediæval city. Integrity and virtue when expressed in architecture, adorned by the arts, voiced in music, set forth in drama, make their appeal as Sanctity. Such living remnants of the old cathedral as survive to-day, tell in faint echoes how sacred to its citizens

was the mediæval city. Upon its ruins rose the magnificence of renaissance palaces for the new nobles, and mansions for an ever-growing "gentry." These edifices engaged the imagination by the sumptuousness of their architecture and by the splendour of their inmates stirred the emotions. Here was the beginning of that "transvaluation of values" of which Nietzsche preached the rounded completion. There is another side to this renaissance picture. It exhibits the city's sacrifice for enrichment of life in a favoured few. That means a depression of personality by impoverishment of inner life amongst the body of citizens. For their descendants and successors, the lower middle classes and the populace of recent and current times, art and literature have been and are less a means to life abundant and more a substitute and compensation for imperfect realisation. But patriciate and proletariat are bound in the bonds of community. Let the unity of civic life be broken, and all pay the penalty sooner or later. Thus for three centuries and more has artistic genius been driven to minister mainly to the needs of individuals, rich and poor alike, lacking a concrete and vital unity of communitary fellowship. The visions of life furnished by literature and poetry, by painting and sculpture, even by architecture (with its facades unrelated to interior design) have been for the most part fragmentary contributions to enhancement accepted in lieu of lost or faded realities. From the civic standpoint they seem to be more of abstractions from life than enhancements of living. Conspicuous, assuredly, in every city is the lapse of architecture from grace of unity. Reflect, for instance, upon the ornamental fronts with which the edifices of business face our main thoroughfares. Classic columns and pediments, carved keystones and florid cornices, presumably impress the passer-by, and so, doubtless, fulfil their unavowed purpose of advertisement. But, unaccompanied by excellence of interior planning, outside magnificence offers poor consolation to clerks and book-keepers bent all day over typewriters and ledgers in chambers, ill-ventilated, ill-lit, ill-proportioned. This current civic custom of masking one kind of interior by another kind of exterior, has its counterpart in the mental habit of individuals. It corresponds to that practice of double lives, one for public gaze, and another for furtive pleasuring of an inner self, to which most of us are given.

By little beyond merely verbal changes, the same story of failure, so far, to reach a living unity and show it forth, could be told of modern science. Are we then condemned to move in a vicious circle, unable to synthesise our resources for lack of vision; unable to create the vision verifiable for lack of synthesis. Certain it is that both vision and synthesis are needed in order to extract beauty from ashes, to distil truth from error, to transmute evil to good. Forbidding in its complexity the problem may seem. But great and splendid are the resources; and obstacles the most formidable turn out often to be

aids invaluable. What for instance could be more dismaying than the successive failures of Western civilization to direct the order of its going during the past five centuries. We have seen the waning of Mediæval Faith; the rotting of Renaissance splendours; the chilling of Reformation ardours; the falsifying of Revolutionary hopes. Yet how the prospect brightens if you view the Reformation and its sequel of revolutionary movements, political and economic, as experimental efforts in a continuing process of trial and error to attain a definite goal. What that goal was and is we begin to discern as the psychology of communitary life lends its aid to the reading of history. Vaguely, almost unwittingly at first, there looms into view and approaches with slowly increasing clearness and majesty of purpose, one grand aim. It was, is and must continue to be an endeavour to unite complementary mediæval and renaissance ideals into one sovran vision of life, and make it come true, in some degree, for everyman, not forgetting his wife and family. To incessant striving for this crowning victory of culture by selecting the finer elements from our Christian and Classical heritages, composing them into a dominant harmony, and making it prevail throughout all classes in town and country—to this we are irrevocably committed. No human hand can break this entail of Western civilization. The more we deliberately design its ordering and scheme its execution, the more it becomes a joyous adventure and the less a melancholy duress. To be discouraged by conditions which the nature of the quest imposes is sheer folly. Frustrations are necessary incidents of the experimental method. Wars are explosions in the chemistry of human reactions, which we have not yet learned to avoid. Vain dreams and illusory visions, if we know how to interpret them, are guideposts at the crossways of life and of civilization. Towards reading their cryptic message, there is growing up a strange new science of necromancy. A clear distinction marks it off from similar efforts in that line of tradition. For phantoms of the dead dwelling in an outer world, the new interpreters substitute impulses of life within us, as main determinants of our fate. Yet a real continuity of thought and aim links the new with the old necromancy. Both discern all around us a cloud of witnesses to the life which is spirit. And perhaps it matters not greatly for practical purposes of guidance and enhancement whether these witnesses be emanations of supernal beings or historic survivals in custom, language, literature, art or other imponderable of the human mind.

THE hopeful feature of the situation is happily a self-renewing one. The stuff of vision is never lacking, since renewed perennially by forth-faring day-dreams in the passion of youth, and by more reminiscent day-dreams in the tranquility of age. Mid-life is the time that suffers most from defect of vision or its deterioration or

debasement. But that is through no fault of Nature. In the ease and leisure of a "successful career," man lapses into the ignoble habit of falling asleep to the life of the spirit. He pays the penalty in missing its denouement as the evolutionary drama unfolds. And of the lost vision that should have been the joy and sustenance of his soul, we are reminded: "at last the man beholds it die away and fade into the light of common day." Even when seemingly awake in his comfortably upholstered stall, the well-nourished citizen is prone to turn away from the "still small voice," in preference for the strident tones of Stentor in the Market, the suave oratory of Sophist in the Forum, the alluring notes of Phryne at the Fair. That means treason to the cloister of vision. It is a betrayal of the spirit of unity. Pictures of delight are given in reward. Of their origin there can be no doubt. They issue not from above but from below. Unfortunately the man-made organs devised for care, sifting, development and transmission of the social heritage are too easily diverted from divine to demonic service. It is perhaps not so much that our educational system, politics, press, popular art and literature gather and transmit the graver and grosser evils of our mingled heritage, as that they preserve, pass on and so multiply, and exaggerate, in our burden, its trivialities, follies, fantasies, formalisms, irrelevancies, ignorances, sectionalisms, partisanship. Yet is there not ground for assurance that in the measure of our striving to replace all these disloyalties to the spirit of unity by an impassioned devotion, we may hope to recover or to develop the vision verifiable? The evolutionist at least enjoys a heartening faith in its advent. His postulates urge him to believe a way can and will be found to socialise, discipline, regularise, and integrate the day-dreaming habit and impulse into a compelling vision of personality and community in deepening accord. If such a way already exists under care of traditional guardians, let them see to it that the approaches are kept unobstructed and open to the passage of adventuring youth.

V. DAY-DREAMS AND VISIONS AS PROCESSES OF LIFE.

THE place of vision in the religious consciousness has ever been taken as focal by writers with an adequate experience of its vital qualities. And continuing this tradition, students of these matters increasingly turn from creeds, dogmas and rituals to the deep impulses and soaring desires which are the stuff, at once vital and mystical, of religion. In this way they are reaching a certain illumination of the religious life, not only as to its formative elements but also as to their modes of working, their creative phases and resultant actions. It is generally agreed that the religious life begins as an awakening to contemplative and mystical issues, with consequent withdrawal into the inner self. The day-dreams, which amongst other results ensue from this arousal to spiritual interests are observed to range in desire and purpose from

the cravings of the lower animal nature, through the ambitions of egotism and the longings of altruism, to the aspirations of a reasonable soul.

BUT all these tendencies arise as impulses in each of us. If one or more of them gets fixed into a habit of mind, a corresponding colour is imparted to character and temperament. But mental habits, like bodily ones, undergo modification, as in going from home to school, falling in love, getting married, becoming a father, making new intimacies of friendship, changing one's occupation, party, religion and so forth. Throughout life there goes on an incessant process of mental habituation, dehabitation, rehabilitation. Each crisis of change is a product of interaction between inner impulse and outer circumstance. But to say that is merely to affirm that it is part of the life-process. The essence of that process being an endeavour after mastery of circumstance, it follows that mind in its changes of habit is seeking an environment that can be moulded to the heart's desires. The day-dream, we are usually told, is an inner refuge from environments hopelessly resistant to the heart's desires. Doubtless, but does it not also carry the impress of a more positive evolutionary content? Does the day-dream not serve too as an instrument of anticipatory exploration, an agency of premeditated trial and error, a means for the rehearsing and therefore in a measure the testing of prospective adaptations? If to the day-dream, active in this sense, there did not attach survival-value, then we should have to search in the arcane powers of the inner life for another kind of fore-looking and integrative impulses contrived to do that work.

To assume this double capacity of day-dreams, as first tranquilising the spirit, then educating, fortifying, energising it, is to ask further questions. What vital interconnection makes these functions one and blends that oneness into the developing scheme of the individual life-cycle, thereby adjusting the day-dreaming process into the larger unity of life-in-evolution. Well, recall that life in its simpler phases, in *amœba* for instance, is an organised seeking after more life, as by hunting and capture of food, followed by the highly elaborated processes of digestion, assimilation, absorption and then extrusion of waste products. This complex scheme of behaviour may be summed from the *amœban* standpoint as an *organised purposiveness*. Higher up the scale of life there develops a still more complex scheme of mastery over environment, as in the *instinctive purposiveness* of bees and wasps. Further on again, there is brought into play an adjustment of widening range through enlarging awareness of a *perceived purpose*, as in the bird's nest-building in the trees, the engineering works of beavers in the water, and in the fortification and ventilating of its underground home by the mole. Then at the summit of life's ascent, as the biologist observes it, there comes an immense deploying of vital forces through

the *conceived purpose* of man consciously studying, scheming, planning, designing, executing.

HERE, in the clear generalisation and vivid phrasing of J. A. Thomson (*THE SYSTEM OF ANIMATE NATURE*, 1920), is a view of nature's four big steps upwards in the never-ending endeavour to adjust the outer circumstance to the inner impulse. They are stages in the slow and fitful journey of an infinitely prolonged ascent, at once a *via dolorosa* and a triumphal procession. The dolor is mainly in a fixation and rooting of life's children at temporary halting places, on side tracks and in blind alleys, where stereotyped modes of self-expression endlessly repeated bespeak a wistful waste of vital potencies. Flash of glow worm, chirp of cricket, cawing of rooks, lowing of cattle, prayer mills of Thibetan monks, all illustrate this tragi-comedy of arrest. The triumph is in an enlarging awareness of purpose which glows as it grows in deepening sense of mastery over circumstance, and intimation of an individual part in the scheme of things. On a peak in this Darien, the mystic holds converse with Deity. To him come moments of an intensified and universal awareness which reveal the vision of a divine plan for perfection. In him once and again the life-impulse becomes impassioned by imagery of perfection. Sustained effort to repeat the rapture of that experience and render it habitual, makes the mystic. The great mystics, creators of religious tradition, are those who ruthlessly test their imagery of perfection in the school of practice, and so rise through alternating agonies of defeat and ecstasies of attainment towards the vision verifiable. They falter not in obedience to the divine command: See that thou makest all things according to the pattern showed thee in the mount.

WHAT is the awakening we call adolescence, but a first sensing by the inner eye of the light that breaks from these mystic heights. And as the youth follows its gleam and beckon he commits himself to the pilgrim's progress. One after another, glimpses of the celestial city are caught in flashes from peak and pass climbed on the way. The civic ideal thus enlarges, deepens, clarifies in harmony with the personal ideal. In proportion as these two ideals melt into one living, moving, throbbing picture of unity in being and in action, the pilgrim achieves the joyous consciousness that comes with a vision of life on the way to fulfilment. And vision carries with it its own instrument of spiritual progress. This instrument is the lifting gladness of sacrifice. And the more it is used to clear the forward path the more is revealed its power of dedicating life's energies to attainment of wholeness with its emotional accompaniment of sanctity.

TRUE, the human wayfarer is slow to see the pilgrim's progress as the commonsense way to life abundant. Rather is he given to planting himself on the foothills below Olympus, discerning but rarely the glories of its snowclad summit. From him, therefore, the subtler

beauties of Parnassian heights are perpetually veiled in Boeotian mists. But suppose this human arrestment be but lack of a vision clear to show the paths of mastery and freedom with their joyousness of spiritual adventure. To that supposition the evolutionist is driven by the postulates of his doctrine. For freedom, mastery, conscious joyousness are increasingly manifest goals in the long, upward and forward march of life's adaptations to a progressive awareness of purpose and awakens to its issues. By his vivid re-telling of the tale of evolution in these terms of spiritual liberation, Bergson has gained his vogue, for in that shape the narrative secures a verificatory response in unsophisticated minds.

RETURN now to the day-dream and mark its record of hits and misses on the target of spirit. Let the mystical impulse and habit, without losing anything of its earth-gripping hold, do its proper work, which is the nourishing, warming, uplifting, refining, fusing of day-dreaming imagery into integral vision; then may the community gather in due season an appropriate harvest in the deeds of a militant spirit. Let the warm imagery of the day-dream cool in the chill bath of the trivial, then the world, maybe, is furnished with another hodman. Let the day-dreaming energies, repressed by deprivation of outlet and expression, sink back into the subconscious life whence they came, then as likely as not they will condense into the poisonous ferment of a diseased mind.

HERE then would seem to be the three possibilities of spirit liberated by the day-dreaming impulse and habit. They are the Vision that inspires to noble deed, and alternatively, Inanition of the spirit or its Putrefaction. These are the alternatives that confront the religious consciousness, not once but again and again at certain intervals in the life cycle of each individual. What Fates preside over the momentous decisions reached in these periodic crises of life? The theologian has long had his reasoned answer; the scientist is but beginning to grapple with the problem, trying to discern the significant facts, and then going on to a first teasing out of the tangled skein. He repeats in his own way the traditional observations of recurrent crises punctuating the individual life in its passage from birth through childhood to youth, thence onward through maturity to age rounded by death's full-stop. In the pause and retreat intervening between each major phase of the cycle, an arrest of external growth and movement is accompanied by an intensifying of the inner life in its striving for the high masteries of spirit and so for the tasting of its mysteries. Throughout each cyclical pause there would seem to take place in the seclusion of inmost chambers, a process of rebirth whereby may be integrated and absorbed the experiments and experiences of the antecedent phase in preparation for the next one. Two stages are dove-tailed in the process. There is first rest and reverie after an arduous journey. There is next an

ebullient endeavour to predict and foresee the coming advance and make ready for its adventures by a sort of symbolic rehearsal. It is presumably in the dark hours before dawn of the spirit's rebirth that to the athlete of mystical life come those awesome trials which seem to him a "wrestling with God."

ON the above view, the process of human renewal is a further elaboration of nature's modes developed for enregistering the mental products of trial and error in the multifarious experiments of animal life striving for mastery of environment. With the bolder sweep of experiment by man came the ingenious device of external registration in language, art, institutions, concretely expressed and approximately integrated in the more abiding life, first of tribal and traditional societies, and next of cities and their civilisations. How this external inheritance of an enlarging tradition adds cumulatively to a community's powers for good and for evil is manifest. Capacities for advance, tendencies to arrest and decline, depend henceforth mainly on adaptations for sifting, transmitting, valuing, incorporating the external heritage in individual lives and the consequent degree of integration between personal and community life-purposes. This human complexity of social inheritance with its two-edged tool of conceptual purpose, compounded with the issues of organic heredity and variation, concentrates and crystallizes in the cyclical crises of our lives. To bring all these seething ferments into unity of action is a problem at once of body, mind and spirit. Stated more in terms of vital intent and evolutionary design, the problem is seen as that of a living three-in-one unity, in which the sequence of achievement is ordained to be spirit-mind-body. What are the resources of material and process, given in nature to be integrated and elaborated by man, for the fashioning of imaginative pictures that can be made to come true by calculated interplay with environment?

BEGINNING at the lower end, as is the way of science, let us speak first of those which might be called resources of body-mind and mind-body. Of these, some work on the amœba-like plan of organised purposiveness (*e.g.*, our white blood corpuscles); others on the insect-like plan of instinctive purposiveness (*e.g.*, our ductless glands perhaps); and others again are moved, like the higher animals, by perceived purpose (*e.g.*, perhaps the brain in its higher functions). Now, man being fated to climb afresh each generation his ancestral pedigree, it is to be assumed that something derived from, related to, or reflecting each of these three kinds of vital integration is at work in our inmost being, urging, guiding, restraining, enhancing the life-impulse even in its higher flights. Indeed the current tendency to interpret the dreams of sleep in the diurnal rhythm as actuated by some subtle combination of instinct and purpose is amongst the most promising of recent advances in psychology. So in the longer and more magisterial

rhythms of the life-cycle an analogous hypothesis suggests itself in reference to our day-dreams. In these there doubtless survives something both of organised and of instinctive purposiveness, but still more of perceived purpose. Yet what essentially characterises the day-dream is surely its high latency of conceptual purpose. But that idea carries us merely to the threshold of the problem. For further insight we seem to be driven back on metaphor and analogy. It may help towards clarity, if we call the day-dream an immature organ of the inner eye ; or again, characterise it as nature's half-formed instrument of subjective vision in course of experimental adaptation to the conceptual purpose of life striving for that mastery we name spirit. Stating the case in a crude mixture of physiology and psychology, one might suppose, in the day-dreaming ferment, a given nucleus of creative life round which the spirit-impulse builds such working model as it can of expanding personality in harmony with enlarging community. The essentials of vision would thus be these : first a certain symbolism or imagery of perfected fulfilment ; next the passion of attainment evoked by the vision. We may surely assume an evolutionary intent in the visioning process. Let us then provisionally define it as a concentrated effort of the organism, in an intensity of awareness, to stir and guide the life-impulse to an optimum fulfilment by a prevision that can be made to come true. What is the specific mode of working that characterises this spirit-mind-body process of man-in-evolution ? If we knew that, we should doubtless possess the key to all the mythologies. The makers of myths that move us see recumbent in a half-veiled alcove of our inner being the mystic figure of Sleeping Beauty. Their imagery pictures for us her modes of awakening, ways of going forth and varieties of adventure ; her soaring visions followed by raptures of flight, marvels of metamorphosis, ecstasies of transfiguration. Other phases of her being and becoming are shown forth ; the deteriorations and debasements she undergoes when subject to spells of evil enchantment ; the follies and devilries she then commits, and the consequent waste and ruin wrought upon a suffering world. As to the how of evading or breaking evil spells, of redemption, of aid in rebirth and renewal of ascent after downfalls, these things are less "featured" in the cinemas of mythology. To fill this gap in humanity's itinerary of progress and plan of salvation, the makers of religions have laboured. Their sacraments are "rites of passage" for conveying our spirit through the major crises of the life-cycle. But these sacraments are more. They have their relevance and their use also in the minor crises of recurrent periodicity shading down to the ebb and flow of the diurnal rhythm. In all these situations the spirit is beset with perils and temptations. The life which is spirit runs perpetual risk of lapsing to life at the lower animal levels ; of falling below these to the mere processes of vegetable physiology ; and thereafter of

descending to the prurient pit of monstrosities and obscenities which characterise human parasitism.

AGAINST this sea of dangers to his spiritual life, man has erected the bulwarks of religion. But the tide of his temptations ever breaks through. A certain dissatisfaction with his religious handiwork is expressed in a phrase almost proverbial which condemns "mere counsels of perfection." And it is little, if any, more than a mere counsel of perfection to say that the remedy for Inanition of Spirit and the antidote to its Putrefaction is the Vision Verifiable and Integral. The practical question is to contrive for every life a developing poise of power and grace. The unity of life and the attainment of personality alike demand a certain sequence and periodicity in the conditions of fulfilment. The awakening of spiritual latencies into creative activity needs its return rhythm of sleep-like quiescence. Between these active and passive phases—the ecstasies and the stases of life—the day-dream appears as nature's coupling. That it may do its human work two things are manifestly essential. Its imagery must be fed from opulent but purified environments and fashioned to vision by harmony of relevant emotion and idea. To the spirit creative, unfailing opportunity must be given for deeds enlarging with the growing experience and expanding scope of the life-cycle.

VI. THE MEANING OF CIVIC DESIGN.

IN the intermittent sovereignty of mind over matter, nothing is easier than to say "must"; nothing more difficult than to "deliver the goods." The situation is not facilitated by the handling of utilitarian economists. They have taught us to think of Demand and Supply as wanton powers, which own allegiance only to a potentate of omnipotence masked under the homely name of Price. It may be, and doubtless is so, within the limited purview of the specialised observer. The sociologist sees, or tries to see, the problem of civilisation in its full range. How to co-ordinate demand and supply, and adjust both to the ideals of life—that is the wider issue. It is the Saturday afternoon problem of the wage-earner's wife, raised to the city level. Think of the manifold adjustments she brings to bear on her solution. The housewife's budget is an index of her family Vision. Its detail of expenditure expresses the fine scheming of a domestic Design. That word of significance in the vocabulary of creative art may surely be applied to a complexity of wifely and motherly planning that looks ahead not only in terms of weeks and months but perhaps of years and even longer. Budget, Design, Vision are the terms of a sequence in which the elements of knowledge and love are present all the time, but in proportions adapted to the particular end in view. Now replace the plain words, knowledge and love, by their wider-ranging equivalents, science and sanctity, and see how it affects the housewife's

problem. Does it not imply the seeking, finding, realising of a larger vision, a more ambitious design, a broader economy? It commits to the threefold office, first of evoking, next of integrating, and, so far, fulfilling, the aspirations of innumerable families and multitudes of persons. Accept that as a statement of the perennial task which confronts ruling combinations of Temporal and Spiritual Powers. At least it may serve to condemn the abstract habit of mind that separates facts from values and forgets to reunite them in singleness of purpose.

URGED by an impulse of uncovenanted catholicity, seers of vision, artists in design, framers of budgets (with masters of synthesis to co-ordinate their thought), might conceivably be brought together, within regional boundaries, to constitute the Civic Synod of their diocese. They would assemble for no vague purpose of general policy determinable by argument and votes, applicable by process of law and administration. Their aim would be this—to reveal a Regional Vision, exhibit a Regional Design, make manifest a Regional Economy. And the kind of vision, design and economy required of them would be such as to win its own way to hearts that desire, minds that foresee, and hands that seek, a better working together of Homes, Workshops, Markets, Schools, Colleges, Churches, Political Assemblies, within the diocese.

It will be said in criticism of our imaginary civic synod that it would in effect prove to be no more than another item added to the interminable list of societies, associations, institutions, groupings, already organised for oiling the wheels of the social chariot and directing its course. Possibly; but the metaphor obscures *rather* than defines the objective. Is not the social chariot too much like a car of juggernaut? And as to directing its course, the more oiling of wheels, the faster and surer its movement along the way chosen by its driver, the Lord of the World. Its victims are many of them individuals who have tried and failed to board the car; many others are losers in the mêlée for favoured places by the box seat, with its chance of snatching at the reins. But no metaphor can portray the complexity of the social situation. True it is that individuals, families, firms, corporations, institutions, villages, towns, cities, nations, engage in struggles for privilege and power. True it is also that they are all of them partners in the common enterprise of creating an environment adapted to the needs and aspirations of community. A mysterious balance of forces tips the scale of life now to the side of rivalry, discord, faction; now to the side of co-operation, harmony, community. But explore the mystery and more often than not you may discover what play of impulses moves the balance. Vision, you observe, exerts a double pressure because an economic thrust pushes from behind, wherever passion of fulfilment pulls from the front. How

vital then the art of evoking and cultivating visions that heal and integrate, as ancient tradition declares by pronouncing it sacred above all other endeavours. But the corresponding economy of resources towards realising such visions has in modern times been abandoned to other than religious direction. Men have come more and more to look to science for guidance in the framing of budgets.

WERE science and religion each inspired to do their utmost in the service of life, clear is the path which each would pursue. Starting at its own pole, with the ideals of life for its goal, religion would push outwards in its exploration of mysteries and experimentations in masteries, up to the point of scheming an economy of energies and resources adapted to approximate realisation of its kingdom of heaven on earth. The reverse movement of science carried to its full length might or might not confirm the conclusions and ratify the counsels of religion. A common measure of their aims and efforts would have to be sought and found on pain of violating the integrity of life. It would seem to be in the sphere of Design that the needed common measure might most hopefully be looked for. In order to fix that elusive word in a sense available for the values of religion and the facts of science, start with its use in architecture. The design of a house remains a mystery in the mind of the architect till it comes to the final act of performance, when it is revealed as an Achievement. But it was implicit all the time in those plans, sections, elevations, drawings, by which the architect communicated his intention to client and builder, and instructed mason, bricklayer, carpenter, joiner, plumber in the detail of execution. The architect himself dreamed the design. His craft technique and professional tradition supplied the means of expressing it in a way precisely adjusted to the end in view. The end of Design is to modulate between Vision and Economy. Design, in abstract, is the vision verifiable made visible to the eye of technique in a viable plan of action. Design, in application, is the economy of vision.

APPLY now this concept of design to the common cause of science and sanctity. The practical question is this. How to bring about definitive relations between the city of God dreamed by religious men, and the city of health and wealth and sanity for which practitioners of applied science scheme and labour? Surely by contriving a technique and building up a tradition of civic design. Already the task is begun. With its simpler aspects of environmental control, we are being familiarised by the progress of the Town-planning movement. But between the elements of site-planning and a communal co-ordinating of domestic construction on one side, and on the other, the high masteries of life over environment, there is a wide gulf to be bridged. An art of civic design needs its complementary science of civilisation. Accept that relation of theory to practice,

and the burden of responsibility is shifted to the shoulders of the sociologist. But forget not that the sociologist is only the plain-man using the resources of science to see life steadily, see it whole, and so discover the corresponding economy of resources. If he would do his work well, enjoying the qualities and evading the disabilities of specialisation, the sociologist must carry the plain-man with him, and all the way. Here emerges the relevance of a civic synod. That phrase states with the brevity of two words, one Latin and the other Greek, a simple but profound truth. It enunciates the fact that all of us who dwell in a particular city are fellow travellers on the same road. It declares that in reality we do, all of us together, unwittingly constitute an empiric kind of civic synod; because, from a common source, we nourish and develop our minds or stunt and pervert them; elate and magnify our souls or contract and debase them. Whether we know it or not we are one pilgrim band marching to the same shrine. We determine our life-values and civilisation-values by interplay with a common environment. We make, unmake and remake at once our city and ourselves, as we walk its streets or loiter in its gardens and open-spaces; buy or sell in its shops; work or supervise in its factories and forges; deal and chaffer in its markets; amuse ourselves or entertain others in its recreation halls; learn or teach in its schools; listen or lecture in its colleges; browse or ponder in its libraries, museums and galleries; worship or scoff in its churches; orate, are rated, or flattered in its political assemblies.

THERE, in the environment and tradition of our city, is the social heritage from which each one of us extracts such means of life abundant as he can, and in return contributes what he has to give. The lure of the city lies in its oblation of visions. They come now as ideals of life, now as temptations. In either case, most of us fall into the habit of adjusting our budget to the means of realisation. We contrive some makeshift of design to modulate between the chosen vision and the required economy. To every citizen, pay-day brings his own version of the housewife's Saturday afternoon problem. Our current cities, and our prevalent habits of mind (the outside and the inside, as it were, of communitary life), being what they are, is it not likely that, in too many cases, *his* design will hinder rather than aid *her* solution. To reverse that probability, a civic synod, wisely instituted, would dream, design, economise and experiment. Meantime what is the practical issue of the argument? It is this. Every man who, by his life-design, makes it easier for the wage-earner's wife to solve her Saturday afternoon problem, thereby takes a step towards the wise instituting of a civic synod; and so brings nearer the reunion of science and sanctity. His own reward is to discover that the attainment of personality comes through realising one's partnership in the civic community. And where, in the common

enterprise, stands that mutually suspicious pair, the priest and the sociologist? The answer is not easy. It may be a condition of all arriving at the celestial city together, that the plain-man, inspired by the exalted common sense of his womenfolk, should carry both priest and sociologist with him, and all the way!

VII. PROSPECTIVE SERVICES OF SCIENCE TO RELIGION.

It is charged against current forms of religion that in adapting their doctrine and ritual to modern needs they inadequately invoke the services of science. But the indictment insufficiently recognises that religion though old in historic time is young, very young, in evolutionary time. It may be that the ennoblement of man through the offices of religion is but beginning. If science would worthily participate in this great human adventure it must first set its own house in order. It must complete its incipient revolution from a mechanocentric system of thought to a vital one. But would that alone be sufficient? Maybe a further turn of its steering wheel would still be needed. Is not the doctrine of evolution itself undergoing an evolution towards a more spiritual goal increasingly glimpsed by the foremost amongst reflective naturalists? If science could thus orient its course, it would be in a position to do what religion has long been doing, to wit, address itself to the making of the future in a thoroughgoing way. And that implies, as a first requisite, the framing of some hypothesis in order to describe rationally and interpret vitally the ways in which man endowed with a latency of conceptual purpose does, in point of fact, use this spiritual equipment and apply it, each one to the making or the marring of his own future.

PERHAPS it is in the field of psycho-analytic research that the furthest advance in this direction has recently been made. But these investigations are, as yet, insufficiently informed by the conception of life as spirit. How disabling a handicap for science this is, if the central activity of life as spirit be the endeavour of each individual to select from the past (his own and that of his community) time-tested elements and compose them into vision as beacon and guide for the future! Make this assumption, that inner-vision is the cutting edge of the evolutionary process in the upward advance of mankind, and that it does its work by selection and recombination of extant data, then many conclusions immediately follow. Not the least insistent is a consequent demand for closer co-operation between psychology and sociology. If the above view of vision be taken, it reinforces the claim both of commonsense and of science that no adequate studies of individual life-cycles can be made without correlative studies of the social heritage. This again implies systematic investigations of past, extant and incipient types of civilisation in relation to (a) vital impulses, (b) spiritual aims, (c) physical environments. In other words the

essential requirement is not only an intimate co-operation of psychology and sociology with one another, but of both with the life-sciences and with geography taken as the mistress science committed to synthesis of all our verified knowledge of environment.

BUT what are the dominant life-sciences? To bracket biology and theology will doubtless seem to most students of both, like trying to mix oil and water. Yet the fact remains that outside the traditional inheritance of theology there exists, in western culture, no systematised body of age-long accumulated knowledge as to how man's life-impulse works in its strivings for an ideal mastery over circumstance. The historic discord between biologist and theologian melts away as each comes more and more to recognise the facts of their common situation. The one has been too much concentrated on the organic origins of life and its animal processes; the other on its spiritual ends and idealising processes. As this confusion disappears, there emerges the natural ground of co-operative endeavour in organising and advancing our knowledge of life. The biologist is coming to see life as a unity of body-mind-spirit; the theologian has long seen it as a unity of spirit-mind-body. A rôle of intermediacy between these two great unities is marked out for psychologist and sociologist.

WHATEVER be the differences of tradition and outlook in these matters, it will doubtless be agreed that, on any view, the facts point to a very definite conclusion as to the making of the future, if in this evolutionary adventure of our race, we would acquire and combine skill of craftsman, reasoned application of science, intuition of poet, experience of mystic. The most thoroughgoing concentration is needed of all our knowledge of body, mind and spirit in their origins, development and incipience; in their interactions with environment and tradition, now and in the past. By no other means can we hope to move forward in orderly fashion towards discovering the optimum conditions of evoking, actualising and integrating the full latencies of individual and social life.

As to the rôle of science in the coming mobilisation of resources a final word, which incidentally may help to prepare for the more detailed study in the following chapter, of correlation between the inner life of impulse, desire and purpose, and the outer life of circumstance. On the making of the future, science must be brought to bear through detailed application of its many and growing specialisms. It must also make its contribution as synthesis. From the former standpoint the making of the future is seen and understood as a series of definite and orderly approaches. For science there is a mechanical and industrial future, an educational future, a hygienic future, a political future, an ethical future and so on throughout the range of the larger specialisms. But simultaneously with movement along all these

sectional approaches runs the problem of integration and its issue in unity. To neglect this central aim in science is like scepticism in religion, to tear out the very keystone of the arch.

FORMULÆ are needed and of every integrative order from simple to complex, but the scientist if he attempts to perform the labours of unity by mere process of formulæ is repeating the effort of those religious persons who pursue saintliness by turning a prayer wheel. The synthesis of science must be a living and concrete affair. Its general problem of the future is no vague and indefinite one but that of the fullest life in the here and now of this particular Person and his Community. More concretely it is the problem of life-abundant for this Home and its Family, this Region, City, Town, Village and their several inhabitants. The factors of attainment are foresight of that fullest life, detailed plans for its achievement and a comprehensive design of realisation. And if this foresight, these plans, and this design do not square with the religious vision of perfection and the means of grace thereto, but one way is open to their concord. All the apparatus for test through trial and error as well as by observation, reflection, intuition, verification must be applied to discovery and removal of the discrepancies. In short we must live a life at once scientific and religious. To allow that there may be two incompatible visions of human felicity is to discard altogether the ideal of unity. It is to repudiate the Vision Verifiable—a vision in tune with the infinite, but not out of tune with the finite, since composed of elements tested in the crucible of science and refined in the cauldron of sanctity, stamped therefore with the seal of integral purpose. Nothing less is worth while. No other ends than the vision splendid, and joy in battling to make it come true, are veritably human. This thrilling feat of creation is alone fitted to the triple purpose of crowning the wonder cycle of man's life, justifying his pathetic striving, solacing his wistful solitude. Therein lies the ultimate aim of play in tender childhood, of quest by radiant youth, of heroic maturity's mission, and of pilgrimage in ennobled age. If it were not so, then would it be a mockery to say the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord.

VICTOR BRANFORD.

HERR SPENGLER AND THE LIFE OF CIVILISATIONS :
by CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

It is now about a dozen years since Professor Flinders Petrie in his little book on "Revolutions of Civilisation" restated the theory of a cyclic movement in history, governing the rise and fall of cultures, a hypothesis which has attracted so many thinkers in the past—notably Vico and Campanella. Yet more recently this theory has become the centre of general interest and discussion on the Continent, thanks to Herr Spengler's striking application of it to the present state of Europe in his now famous book "The Decline of the West." Hitherto this work has attracted much less interest in England than elsewhere, partly no doubt on account of the difficulty of procuring German books during the latter part of the war, and indeed for some time afterwards. It was not accessible to me when I prepared the paper, delivered before the Sociological Society last December, on the Life of Civilisations. But even at the present time when the second volume of the work is on the eve of publication,* there may, I hope, still be room for a brief summary and discussion of Herr Spengler's theory. HERR SPENGLER's aim has been to create, not a philosophy of history in the old sense of the term, but a new, historical, kind of philosophy. It is by his intense feeling for the world as a living process, that the modern Western European differs most profoundly from the men of other ages and cultures. World history means infinitely more to him than it meant to the thinkers of ancient Greece or of India. To the latter at any rate, Time and consequently History, were without value or ultimate significance, to the modern European they are the very foundation of his conception of reality. Yet this sense of history has not found adequate expression in our philosophical systems. The metaphysicians of modern Europe, like their predecessors in classical antiquity, have viewed the world as a system, a great closed order resting on the principle of Causality, not a living organism. They have looked at the universe with the eyes of the physicist rather than with the eyes of the biologist, and have systematized it as the production of dead law instead of as the creation of living spirit. Nor have the historians themselves done better. They concentrate their attention on facts and events, they accumulate masses of detail without giving any heed to the informing Spirit which alone gives significance to the material circumstance. They view History "as a tape worm which tirelessly puts forth fresh 'Epochs,' instead of as a life-series of highly developed organisms."

IN Herr Spengler's view World History is nothing less than a "Second Cosmos," with a different content and a different law of movement to that of the first Cosmos, Nature, which has hitherto absorbed the

*This has now appeared (June, 1922.)

attention of the philosopher. It has its own internal law—*Schicksal* or *Destiny*, as distinguished from the law of *Causality*, which rules the world of *Nature*. That is to say, historical time is not mere numerical succession, it is the registration of a life process like the years of a man's life. Until the unities that lie behind the time cycles of history have been grasped, it is useless to try and explain historical change by secondary causes. But if it is possible to attain an internal knowledge of history, if we could grasp intuitively the principle that gives unity to an age or to a culture, then history will take an organic form, and we shall be able to see in all historic phenomena the expression of a moulding force behind the play of circumstances.

THIS unifying principle Herr Spengler finds in the spirit of the great world-cultures. He claims that each culture has an individual style or personality, which can be seized intuitively by whoever possesses a feeling for history, just as the individual genius of a great musician or artist can be recognised by the born critic in all his works. This individual style is not confined to the art or the social forms of a culture, as some have thought; it extends to philosophic thought, to science and to mathematics. Each culture has its distinctive *number*, so that there is a deep inner bond between the geometry of Euclid and the Greek tragedy, between algebra and arabesque, between the differential calculus and contrapuntal music. This principle of the organic interconnection of all the expressions of a particular culture is carried by Herr Spengler to paradoxical lengths. He maintains that there is an "intimate dependence of the most modern physical and chemical theories on the mythological conceptions of our Germanic forefathers": that Perspective in Painting, Printing, Credit, Long Range Artillery and Contrapuntal Music, are all of them expressions of one psychic principle, while the city State, the nude statue, Euclid and the Greek coin are alike expressions of another. There is, in fact, no human activity which is not the vehicle of the cultural soul; the most abstract scientific thought and the most absolute ethical systems are partial manifestations of a process which is bound up with a particular people and a geographical region, and have no validity outside the domain of their own culture.

THIS leads to the most fundamental philosophic relativism. "There are no eternal truths. Each philosophy is an expression of its own age, and only of its own age, and there are no two ages which possess the same philosophical intentions." The vital question for a philosopher is whether he embodies the *Zeitgeist*, "whether it is the soul of the age itself which speaks by his works and intuitions." Hitherto the philosophers have had no inkling of this truth. They have exalted the standards of conduct and the laws of thought of the modern Western European into absolute laws for humanity, they have not realised the possibility of a different soul and a different truth to their own. The

historians have shared their error. The civilisation that they saw around them was "Civilisation," the movement that brought it to maturity was "Progress." They did not dream that European civilisation was a limited episode like the civilisations of China and Yucatan.

THE time has come, Herr Spengler says, to make a revolution comparable to the abandonment of the geocentric astronomy, to introduce a new "Copernican" philosophy of history, which will study each culture by the laws of its own development, which will not subordinate the past to the present, or interpret the souls of other cultures by the standards that are peculiar to our own. The task of the true historian then must be to write the biographies of the great cultures as self-contained wholes, which follow a similar course of growth and decay, but are as unrelated to one another as different planetary systems. These great cultures are eight in number, Egypt, Babylonia, India, China, the Maya culture of Central America, the culture of classical antiquity, the Arabian culture and the culture of Western Europe. There are in addition a few cultures which have failed to attain full development, such as those of the Hittites, the Persians and the Quichua.

THE dawn of a new culture is seen in the rise of a new mythology, which finds expression in the heroic saga and epic. Herr Spengler instances the Vedic mythology for India, the Olympian mythology and the Homeric poems for Antiquity, primitive Christianity and the Gospels for the "Arabian" culture, and "Germanic Catholicism" and the Nibelungenlied for Western Europe. In the next stage—"summer"—the culture attains to full self consciousness. This is the time of the rise of the characteristic philosophies, and the building up of a new mathematic, which is, in Herr Spengler's view, perhaps the most fundamental criterion by which to fathom the essence of a culture. Pythagoras and Descartes, Parmenides and Galileo are the representatives of this phase.

"AUTUMN" is marked by a loosening of social cohesion, by the growth of rationalism and individualism. At the same time the creative power of a culture finds its final expression in the great conclusive philosophical systems, and in the work of the great mathematicians. It is the period of Plato and Aristotle, of Goethe and Kant, but also of the Sophists and the Encyclopædists.

IN "Winter" the inner development of a culture is complete. After the triumph of the irreligious and materialistic weltanschauung, "Culture" passes away into "Civilisation," which is its inorganic, fossilized counterpart, and which finds its spiritual expression in a cosmopolitan and ethical propaganda, such as Buddhism, Stoicism and 19th century Socialism. A similar course of development is traced in art, in economics and in political organisation, and at the root of the whole process lies the Life of a People in its intimate connection with a definite geographical region, so that the passing of

a culture is at the same time the passing of a people from the land that has fed and nursed it, into the melting pot of cosmopolitanism, the birth of a new population of "déracinés."

EVERY historic culture must pass through this life process, just as every human being must pass through the same life cycle from birth to death. And consequently each phase in the life of a particular culture finds its analogy in every other culture. Each event or personality possesses not only a local and temporary importance, it has also a symbolic meaning, as temporary representative of a universal type. There is not merely a superficial historical parallel, there is an organic identity between the place of Napoleon in our culture and that of Alexander in antiquity, between the Sophists and the Encyclopædists, between the Ramessides and the Antonines. This principle is of the greatest importance for Herr Spengler's theory. By its use he claims that it will be possible not only to reconstruct vanished civilisations, as the palæontologist reconstructs some prehistoric creature from a single bone, but even to establish a law for the "Pre-determination of History," so that when once the underlying idea of a culture has been grasped, it will be possible to foretell the whole course of its growth and the actual dates of its principal phases.

HERR SPENGLER'S aim throughout his work is in fact a practical one. He wishes to plot out the descending curve of Western Civilisation, to make the present generation conscious of the crisis through which it is passing and of the true task that lies before it.

DER UNTERGANG DES ABENDLANDES is nothing else but the final passing of the Western Culture and the coming of "Civilisation." Consequently the "architectonic" possibilities of the Western soul have been realised, and there remains only the practical task of conservatism. The age has no more a need of artists and philosophers and poets, it calls for men of "Roman hardness," engineers, financiers, and organisers, of the type of Cecil Rhodes.

It is Herr Spengler's desire that the men of the new generation should turn to "der Technik statt der Lyrik, der Marine statt der Malerei, der Politik statt der Erkenntniskritik." The governing movement of the new age is to be Socialism, not the Socialism of the idealist or the revolutionary, but a practical, organising, imperialist Socialism which stands as far from the latter, as did the world city of the Roman lawyer and governor from the world City of the Stoic theorists.

HERE then is the final task of the German people. As the 2nd century before Christ saw Rome step into the place of the Hellenistic monarchies, so Prussia takes over the direction of the world from France and England.* The hour of Cannæ is past, the coming age will

*Herr Spengler's book was of course published during the course of the war (1917).

be the age of Cæsar. And in the East there is a redness in the sky—the first sign of the dawn of the new Russian culture of the future.

To the English mind, ever suspicious of the theorist, and perhaps of the historical theorist more than others, Herr Spengler's views may seem so fantastic as to be hardly worth consideration. I write however from the standpoint of one who is a firm believer in the organic life of civilisation, and of the existence of a cyclic movement in history, which determines the main phases of the life of peoples. The time is surely ripe for the abandonment of what Herr Spengler calls the Ptolemaic view of history, and for the beginnings of a scientific morphology of culture. But the new science is in its infancy, and it is a bold step to attempt at this early stage a detailed predetermination of history, such as we find in "*Der Untergang des Abendlandes*." Such a scheme can only be carried through by a drastic selection of facts, and indeed Herr Spengler has not avoided that pitfall of over simplification which has proved the ruin of so many earlier philosophies of history.

THUS while fully admitting that the principle of "the life of peoples" is at the root of the cyclic movement in history, one hesitates to confine all cultural achievement to the 8 or 12 culture-peoples, each of which is responsible for a complete and independent civilisation. There is little room in Herr Spengler's scheme for cultural interaction and admixture, still less for the co-operation of several peoples in one civilisation.

THUS in the culture of the Ancient World everything must be explained as the life work of two culture peoples, the Greeks and the Romans. The last vital act of this culture was the building of the Roman Empire—a vast work of material organisation. After that, there is nothing but petrification and death. How then are we to explain the cultural phenomena of the Imperial epoch—the rise of Christianity, the philosophy of Plotinus, the mathematics of Diophantus and the renewal of architecture and art? Herr Spengler answers that all this is the work of a new people, it belongs to the first stages of the Arab culture-cycle, which develops itself under the crust of the dying classical civilisation. The heroic mythus, which marks the dawn of the consciousness of this new people is embodied in the Gospels and in primitive Christianity, as that of the Greeks was expressed in the Homeric poems and in the Olympian mythology. The Pantheon at Rome is the Urmoschee—the starting point of Arab architecture, and with Diophantus we first come into contact with a new mathematic as foreign from the Hellenic geometry, as is the "Magic" arabesque spirit of that culture from the "Olympian," statuesque spirit of Hellenism.

Is Herr Spengler justified in thus calling up a new racial culture like a *deus ex machina* to cut the knots of his historical problem? Certainly the new elements in later Hellenistic civilisation may be explained as due to Oriental influences, but these influences come not

from the budding energies of a new people, but from older peoples whose cultural development was even older than that of the Hellenes. The "heroic" phase of Arab culture, is to be found in the stories of 'Antara the son of Sheddad, Hatim et-T'ai, Chanfara and the other open-handed bloodthirsty heroes of Arab legend—in the wars that sprang from the rivalry of the horse Dahis and the mare Ghabra, all of which is far more comparable to the spirit of the Homeric poems than the Sermon on the Mount. The Gospels and Primitive Christianity belong rather to the last stage of the Judæo-Aramæan culture—a culture which had expressed its "heroic" phase a thousand years earlier in the sagas of Samson, of Deborah, of Gideon and the like. All this results from Herr Spengler's over simplification which only allows him to take account of a single people in dealing with a particular civilisation. In reality it is impossible to simplify to this degree any civilisation except the most primitive ones. So long as a people exists it possesses a cultural tradition, and however depressed and passive this may seem in relation to the creative culture of the dominant people in a world civilisation, it is nevertheless capable of far-reaching influences and reactions. Professor Flinders Petrie in his well-known study on the *Revolutions of Civilization* brings evidence to prove that a single people—such as the Egyptian—passes through successive culture-cycles; and though it is probable that without external influence or the infusion of fresh blood such cycles would tend to become stereotyped repetitions of the culture that has been previously worked out (as is perhaps the case in modern China), yet if once these stereotyped cultures were brought into contact with a new civilisation, they would possess great potentialities for cultural influence. Thus, for example, in dealing with Islam we must not only take account of the culture of the Arabs of Arabia, who created the original Islamic State. There is also the Byzantine-Syro-Egyptian culture of the Levant, an old mature civilisation which influenced Islam from the cradle; there is the Sassanian-Persian culture which had a vital influence on Islam even before the days of the Abbasids; there is the culture of Khorasan and TransOxiana, mainly Persian, but possibly containing a Bactrian Greek element, and certainly affected by Indian Buddhist influence; finally there are the non-cultured peoples—the Turks who were for centuries in contact with Persian and Chinese civilisation, the Berbers, who had previously been under the influence of the Roman-Hellenistic culture, and last of all the negroes. All these cultures and peoples brought their contributions to the civilisation of mediæval Islam, so that under the surface uniformity of Arabic language and religion and institutions, an extraordinary process of fermentation and change was taking place.

AGAIN take the apparently much simpler case of our own Western European culture. Here we have several peoples, composed of

different racial elements, all co-operating in the development of a common culture heritage. The life-cycles of these peoples do not necessarily synchronize, nor do they all come under the influence of the common culture-heritage in the same measure. Italy was in the direct line of the Græco-Roman tradition which only lightly affected the civilisation of the Baltic lands. Yet Herr Spengler takes the view that the whole of our civilisation is essentially the work of one people—the Germans. Consequently he begins its life-cycle, not with the Barbarian Invasions, as the parallel of the ancient world would suggest, but in the centuries which produced the Crusades, the *Nibelungenlied* and Wolfram von Eschenbach's *Parsifal*. This initial error falsifies his whole series of analogies between the ancient and modern cultures. He compares the Athenian democracy to the Bourbons instead of to Renaissance Italy, the age of Alexander to that of Napoleon instead of to the first European expansion in the 16th century, and the present age to that of the early Punic wars instead of to the Imperial epoch. Hence the depressing character of his forecast, since he would have us spend the next two centuries in that work of material organisation which has actually occupied us for the last 200 years.

IN reality since our civilisation is the work of several peoples it embraces several parallel life-cycles. The most representative of these is no doubt that of the French, which stands mid-way between the early ripening of the Italians and the late maturity of the Germans. Indeed in many respects France has a similar importance for our culture to that which Hellas possessed for the culture of antiquity. Nevertheless this is but an average standard, and it can only be applied with exactitude to the French portion of the Western European culture-area.

MOREOVER it is clear that in order to explain the life of civilisations it is not sufficient to possess a formula for the life-cycle of individual peoples, we must also understand the laws of cultural interaction and the causes of the rise and fall of the great cultural syncretisms, which seem to overshadow the destinies of individual peoples. Considered from this point of view the last stage of a culture, the phase to which Herr Spengler confines the name of "Civilisations," acquire peculiar importance. It is not merely a negative period of petrification and death, as he describes it; it is the time when civilisation is most open to external influence. The true significance of the Roman Hellenistic period, for example, is not decay but syncretism. Two different streams of culture, which we describe loosely as "Oriental" and "Western," as "Asiatic" and "European" flowed for several centuries in the same bed, mingling with one another to such a degree that they seemed to form a new civilisation. And this intermingling of culture was not merely of importance for the past as the conclusion of the old world, it had a decisive influence on the future. The passing of ancient civilisation and the coming of a new age, is marked, it is

true, by these two streams once more separating and flowing out again to East and West as the new Daughter Cultures of Islam and Western Europe, though the central river bed is still occupied for a time by the dwindling stream of the Byzantine civilisation. Nevertheless the two streams continued to bear witness to their common origin. The West was moulded by a religion of the Levant, the East carried on for centuries the tradition of Hellenic philosophy and science. Aristotle and Galen travelled to India with the Moslems, to Scotland and Scandinavia with the Christians. Roman law lived on alike with the mediæval canonists and the Ulema of Islam. But because Islam inherited so largely from the Hellenistic-Oriental culture of Roman times Herr Spengler is not justified in giving an Arabic origin to the latter; the Arabs entered into the cultural inheritance in the East, just as the Germanic peoples did in the West, as heirs not as originators. And as East and West, each in its own measure, have received the inheritance of Hellenic culture, so too is it with the tradition of Israel. Without that tradition neither Christendom nor Islam is conceivable; each claims it as its peculiar birth-right. It is interwoven with the very texture of the Koran; it lives on in modern Europe; indeed it was nowhere stronger than it has been in the new countries—in Calvinist Scotland, in Lutheran Scandinavia, in Puritan New England. And it was in the same age of syncretism, the mature period of the Hellenistic-Oriental culture, that the Jewish tradition acquired these new contacts and opportunities for expression. Since then the different culture streams have been flowing away from one another, but they still bear the indelible character set upon them by that decisive period of intercourse and fusion.

HENCE there appears to be ample evidence for the existence of two movements in history; one of which is intimately connected, as Herr Spengler shows, with the life of an individual people in contact with a definite geographical environment, while the other is common to a number of different peoples, and results from political, intellectual and religious synthesis and interaction. Only by taking account of both these movements, is it possible to understand the general movement of history and explain that real element of integration and progress, which causes different civilisations to be, not closed worlds without meaning for one another, but progressive stages in the life of humanity.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY:¹

by HARRY ELMER BARNES, Professor the History of Thought and Culture, Clark University.

I. LESTER FRANK WARD (1841-1913)²

THOUGH Lester F. Ward was by profession a paleo-botanist, and based his sociology to a large degree upon biological and physical analogies, processes and terminology, he also made notable contributions to a systematization of psychological sociology. His psychological interpretation of society was clear, logical and consistent. His contributions to psychological sociology may be summed up under the headings of a classification of the social forces, the psychology of social forces, the explanation of the dualistic nature of the psychic factors operative in society, and the emphasis upon the overwhelming importance of conscious social effort at improvement.

WARD divides social forces into two major types—physical and spiritual or psychic. The physical forces he classifies as ontogenetic and phylogenetic. The ontogenetic are of two types, positive or attractive, which function in the quest of organic pleasure, and negative or protective, which operate in avoiding organic pain. The phylogenetic forces are of two varieties, the direct or sexual, and the indirect or consanguineal. The spiritual or psychic forces he divides into three types, the moral, exerted in seeking the safe and the good; the æsthetic, expended in seeking the beautiful; and the intellectual, utilized in seeking the useful and the true.³

THE psychology of the individual mind and the psychology of society are dualistic in nature. The psychology of the individual may be viewed as that of feeling and thought, as affective and perceptive psychology, or as subjective and objective psychology.⁴ In this dualism of the mental factors, the instincts and emotions, with the resulting feelings and desires, are the driving forces, while intellect is the controlling and directive element.⁵ This dualism characterizes, likewise, the psychology of the social forces. The study of the instincts and emotions which operate in society constitutes what may be called

¹These articles should be regarded as a continuation of the two previous papers which were published by the writer in the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW* of July and October, 1921, on "Some Contributions of American Psychology to Modern Social and Political Theory."

²The writer has attempted a general survey and estimate of Ward's contribution to social and political theory in the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, September, 1919.

³*PURE SOCIOLOGY*, pp. 256ff.

⁴*OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY*, pp. 95-6; *DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY*, Vol. I., pp. 357ff; *PURE SOCIOLOGY*, pp. 111ff.

⁵*OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY*, pp. 100ff; *PURE SOCIOLOGY*, pp. 97ff, 124ff.

the subjective psychology of society, while the intellectual factors, perceptions and their elaboration, are investigated by the objective psychology of society.¹

WARD relates his psychology of society to his general system of sociology.² The object of nature as a whole is function. The end of organic life is feeling. The purpose of society is effort. This is the ascending series in the psychological interpretation of cosmic, biological and social processes.³ Feeling has a biological genesis, developing according to the law of survival and associated with the processes of nutrition, reproduction, flight and other basic activities in organic and social evolution.⁴ The dynamic guiding and limiting factors in psycho-genesis are those which relate to the securing of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This is as true in explaining the psychology of society as in interpreting the behaviour of the individual. Pleasure has a survival value in both biological and social evolution. The desire to secure more pleasure and to diminish pain is the dynamic factor in social causation. The increase of pleasure and the elimination of pain in society is one of the chief tests of progress.⁵ Pleasure may be classified on an ascending scale, namely, reproductive, nutritive, æsthetic, emotional, moral and intellectual. Progress is to be measured, not only on the basis of the total increase of pleasure, but also according to the degree to which the higher forms of pleasure are cultivated and exploited.⁶

BUT this dynamic pleasure-pain impulse is not adequate as a guide to social development. There must be a directive element. Natural genesis, which results from undirected response to organic stimuli, is wasteful and slow. It is the supreme achievement of human society to have freed the human and social mind from the determinism of material and organic factors and to have made it possible for the intellect to assume a creative and artificially directing control over social and cultural evolution. This triumph of the mind over material and social conditions Ward designates as social *telesis*—the attainment of consciously willed and deliberately-planned social progress.⁷

WARD believed that the chief agency in social telesis should be the state, and he was a thoroughgoing exponent of an increase of state activity.⁸ Yet, he was fully conscious of the defects of modern political organisation, and held that before any extensive creative social achievement could be expected there must be a thorough reform of the political activity of modern society and an inauguration of a socialized system

¹PSYCHIC FACTORS OF CIVILIZATION, *passim*.

²CF. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, September, 1919, pp. 150ff.

³OUTLINES OF SOCIOLOGY, pp. 114-15.

⁴Ibid., pp. 95-7.

⁵Ibid., pp. 100ff; PSYCHIC FACTORS OF CIVILIZATION, Chap. vii.

⁶Ibid., p. 108.

⁷Ibid., pp. 109ff; PURE SOCIOLOGY, pp. 463ff.

⁸PURE SOCIOLOGY, pp. 573-5.

of education. Legislators must become competent and informed social scientists, relying upon the best and latest information in these fields.¹ When we shall have obtained such a form of enlightened political society we shall find ourselves in what may be called a sociocracy. The characteristics of this stage of social evolution Ward describes in the following characteristic paragraph :—

As a scientific investigator, the legislator would then set for himself the task of devising means to render harmless those forces now seen to be working evil results, and to render useful those now running to waste. Not only would the present prohibitive legislation, which seeks to accomplish its ends by direct, or brute, method, be rapidly supplanted by attractive legislation accomplishing its purposes by the indirect, or intellectual, method, and thus fulfilling the protective functions of government at a saving of enormous loss through the friction of opposition, but the accommodative function would now be in condition to advance towards the position of a truly ameliorative one. Society, possessed for the first time of a completely integrated consciousness, could at last proceed to map out a field of independent operation for the systematic realization of its own interests, in the same manner that an intelligent and keen-witted individual pursues his life-purposes. Not only would protection and accommodation be secured without loss of liberty and at the least possible cost to society, but directly progressive measures would be adopted looking to the organization of human happiness. Fully realizing the character and mode of operation of the truly progressive agencies of society, government would not simply foster and protect these, but would increase and intensify them and their influence. No longer doubting that progress upon the whole must be in proportion to the degree and universality of intelligence, no effort or expense would be spared to impart to every citizen an equal and adequate amount of useful knowledge.²

WARD's leading contribution to the psychology of politics, then, was to emphasize the socio-psychological basis of intelligent state-activity. While assigning full significance to the instinctive and emotional elements in social behaviour, he did not seek refuge in the impotence and helplessness of the anti-intellectualism which has characterized much of modern social psychology, but clearly demonstrated the superior and directive capacity of the intellectual factors in society, and developed a system of sociology in which the element of social *achievement* was the central factor. Professor Giddings has well summarised this basic contribution of Ward :—

THROUGHOUT all Ward's work there runs one dominating and organizing thought. Human society, as we who live now know it, is not the passive product of unconscious forces. It lies within the domain of cosmic law, but so does the mind of man ; and this mind of man has knowingly, artfully, adapted and readapted its social environment, and with reflective intelligence has begun to shape it into an instrument wherewith to fulfil man's will. With forecasting wisdom man will perfect it, until it shall be at once adequate and adaptable to all its uses. This he will do not by creative impulse evolving in a void, but by constructive intelligence shaping the substantial

¹DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY, Vol. II., Chap. xiv.

²Ibid., Vol. II., pp. 249-50.

stuff of verified scientific knowledge. Wherefore, scientific knowledge must be made the possession of mankind. Education must not merely train the mind. It must also equip and store, with knowledge.

THIS great thought Dr. Ward apprehended, expressed, explained, illuminated, drove home to the mind of all who read his pages, as no other writer, ancient or modern, has ever done. It is his enduring and cogent contribution to sociology.¹

II. SIMON NELSON PATTEN (1852-).²

SIMON N. PATTEN is usually and correctly classified as an economist, one of the most original of American workers in this field.³ He has also made some important contributions to theoretical sociology, a number possessing significance for a psychological interpretation of political and social processes. Indeed, no writer in the field has been more prolific with original doctrines and daring hypotheses. Professor Bristol has well characterized his work in this respect: "An apparent strain after the novel characterizes all his writings, and in the earlier, especially, deductive rather than inductive reasoning. That he has given the world hastily-formed hypotheses unsupported by scientific investigation is indicated by the fact that he has had but few followers, though many admirers, and that he has so frequently shifted his position and negatived former conclusions. Such a writer is frequently suggestive but rarely convincing."⁴ Space does not allow us to follow Professor Patten into a critical exposition of all of his fertile socio-psychological theories; we can only summarize briefly those which seem to have some permanent value and application.

In a characteristically paradoxical manner Patten denies that sociology has any relation to psychology and then proceeds to develop his theoretical sociology along almost strictly psychological lines.⁵ There are, according to Patten, two neuro-psychic systems which operate in the individual and society—the motor and the sensory. The motor system is evolved by the pursuit of pleasure, while the sensory has developed to avoid and decrease the sources of pain.⁶ Social evolution may be regarded as a process of increasing the sources of pleasure and decreasing the sources of pain.⁷ This process is advanced, at first, primarily through the struggle with the objective or physical environment, which process produces a progressively better set of technical aids in overcoming the obstacles of the environment and

¹AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. XIX., pp. 67-8.

²There is a good brief summary of the socio-psychological doctrines of Patten in L.M. Bristol, SOCIAL ADAPTATION, pp. 236-44.

³He has emphasized the field of Consumption, and has tended towards optimism.

⁴Op. cit., p. 237.

⁵"The Relation of Sociology to Psychology," in ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, November, 1896, pp. 1-28.

⁶THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, Chap. ii. For Patten's fearful and wonderful theories of psychogenesis see his HEREDITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS, *passim*.

⁷THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, Chap. iv.; THEORY OF PROSPERITY.

adapting it to human use.¹ Particularly important is the creation of a social surplus for progress. The creation of a surplus rather than the struggle with deficiency is the chief cause of progress.²

ONE of the major dynamic factors in biological, psychological and social evolution is the change from one environment to another. This transition necessitates readjustment to new conditions and stimulates the development of new types of reactions and adjustments, thus increasing the range of creative and productive ingenuity and the adaptability of the organism and the social group.³ In the earliest stages of evolution the struggle was chiefly a biological process within a local physical or objective environment, but with later developments the contacts and interests came to be wider than any objective local environment. There develops a generalized objective environment, bringing with it a far wider range of conditions and a broader set of stimuli and reactions. In the local environment, where the process was chiefly biological, the motor side of mental activity, with its direct type of attack, was most significant and effective. In the later and more generalized environment the sensory side of mental activity, which relies mainly upon indirect modes of attacking the problems of existence and survival, becomes the more consequential.⁴ In this later process of adjustment to a generalized environment through reliance upon the sensory powers the progress is mainly social, as contrasted with the earlier biological progress resulting from the conflict with a local environment on a motor level.⁵ Social progress, then, is correlated with the development of the sensory powers and the transition from a local to a general environment.⁶ The development of the sensory powers is, moreover, a doubly dynamic factor, as it not only makes possible adjustment to, and control over, a generalized objective environment, but also creates the subjective environment of habits, customs and modes of thought, which brings the socio-psychic elements into play as an aid to social progress and cultural development.⁷

This tendency to make life depend upon a greater number of conditions, although these conditions may be less complete than the fewer conditions of the local environment, lies at the basis of the movement of beings from favoured localities to a more general environment. With each addition to the sensory powers this general environment can be enlarged and life can be made to depend on more complex conditions. An isolated individual is not able to utilize this enlarged environment. He must be supported by

¹THEORY OF PROSPERITY, pp. 166ff; THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, pp. 9-11, Chap. iii.

²THEORY OF PROSPERITY, pp. 166ff; HEREDITY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS, Chap. i.; THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, Chap. v.; THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY (Supplement to the ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, November, 1921), pp. 90ff.

³THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, Chaps. i., iii.

⁴Ibid., Chap. iii.

⁵Ibid., pp. 49ff.

⁶Ibid.; "The Relation of Sociology to Psychology," loc. cit., pp. 6ff.

⁷Ibid., pp. 53ff.

other beings. Indirect activities must also displace the direct activities of lower beings. This co-operation of beings and the change in the direction of their activities depend upon the growth of social feelings. The aggressive instincts must be checked or turned into new channels. Habits, customs, and modes of thought must be acquired which will enable individuals to live in peace with one another and to get pleasure out of one another's society. All these changes depend upon the development of the sensory powers, and show the marked contrast which exists between beings in whom the sensory powers are developed and those in whom the motor powers are still dominant

.....
THE movement of a society to a more general environment lessens the dependence of its members upon the conditions of the objective environment and increases their dependence upon the conditions of the subjective environment. The requisites for survival gradually become subjective and progress depends more and more on the development of the sensory powers.¹

WHILE human and social progress may be viewed as a progressive transition from a local objective environment to a generalized objective environment and, finally, to a subjective environment, it may be looked upon in an even broader manner as an evolution from a pain to a pleasure economy, and from a pleasure economy to a creative economy.² In a pain economy man is dominated by fear of enemies and is surrounded by innumerable sources of pain and misery not yet eliminated by technical and cultural evolution and the resulting socio-psychic changes.³ In a pleasure economy the sources of pain are greatly reduced and man is dominated by two main groups of motives, namely, those impelling acts which increase individual pleasure and those inducing behaviour which advances group welfare. The subjective environment in the pleasure economy takes on a form which tends to prevent any divergence between acts promoting individual and social welfare. We are now in a state of transition from a pain to a pleasure economy.⁴ This pleasure economy is one based upon the pleasures of consumption, but a higher economy is one which is founded upon the pleasures of thought and action. This might be truly called a creative economy. Humanity may ultimately aspire to such an economy.⁵ The following table summarises Patten's views on psychic, social and cultural evolution :—⁶

STAGE OF PROGRESS.	FORM OF STRUGGLE.	FORM OF CONTROL.	CHARACTER OF THE SOCIAL BOND.
1. A pain economy.	Race struggle.	Ancestral control.	Blood bonds.
2. A pleasure economy.	Class struggle.	Wealth control.	Interest bonds.
3. A creative economy.	Self-direction.	Character control.	Social beliefs.
TYPE OF THOUGHT.	THOUGHT LIMITATIONS.	KIND OF PHILOSOPHY.	TYPE OF MORALITY.
1. Theological.	Substance.	Anthropomorphic.	Traditional.
2. Rational.	Space.	Material.	Utilitarian.
3. Pragmatic.	Time.	Ideal.	Telic.

¹THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, pp. 51-2, 53.

²Ibid., Chap. iv., RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY, loc. cit.

³Ibid., pp. 75ff.

⁴Ibid., pp. 180ff.

⁵THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY, pp. 90ff.

⁶Ibid., p. 92, reproduced in Bristol, SOCIAL ADAPTATION, p. 243.

We may conclude our brief review of Patten's contributions to the psychological aspects of social and political theory by a summary of his discussion of the evolution of social control. According to Patten there are no psychic causes of society. "It is not the psychic progress of men that makes them social . . . Society is made, not by any psychic or physical necessity, but by certain complex aggregates of psychic and physical phenomena. The formation of these aggregates and their influence on social phenomena can be explained only by a study of the environment." The earliest social bonds were purely physical and external. They were originated by men taking refuge in the same retreat in the primitive pain economy.¹ The development of methods and institutions of social control comes only with the entry into a pleasure economy and the evolution of sources of pleasure from which certain members of the social group can be excluded by leaders or rulers :—²

SOCIAL control is limited by the utility of the society to the individual, and before it can be exerted efficiently there must be some important pleasure or pleasures from which the leaders of society can exclude refractory individuals

THUS we see that the home, the family and society are environment ideas. They are due to the place relations, which the early types of a pleasure economy created, and are changed and developed with the changes it has undergone. To these common pleasures the different forms of control are due. Men subordinate themselves to external conditions or to other men, so that they can participate more fully in the enjoyments of a pleasure economy. Impulses are thus generated, which expand the feeling of identity, and thus bind the individual to all the objects and persons in his pleasure world. He acts with them and through them as naturally as though their dictates originated within himself.³

THE ruling classes are those groups which have obtained control of the sources of pleasure or of a certain important part of them. The limit of power and authority is determined by the degree to which the majority may be excluded from pleasures without inciting rebellion. Objective and centralized control of pleasures is characteristic of autocratic political society, while diffused and subjective control is the mark of a democratic polity. Such political concepts as the "state of nature," "natural rights," "liberty," and "equality" are but the results of the attempts of the ruling classes in the present age to visualize and rationalize the past in such a manner as to justify and protect the conditions essential to their present prosperity. They have no real historical foundations.⁴

THE ultimate political goal of man is a "social commonwealth," in which the sources of pleasure will be democratized and made generally

¹"The Relation of Sociology to Psychology," loc. cit., pp. 14ff.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

⁴Ibid., pp. 17-21.

available.¹ Patten's social commonwealth is not unlike Ward's "sociocracy," in that it is a socialized polity dominated by ideals of conscious progress and co-operative effort. "The civic ideals, or, to use a more familiar term, the democratic ideals, are the enduring elements of human progress. They are the surviving concepts of a long series of subjective environments. They stand out more clearly after each transition from environment to environment. Each change breaks down some of the feelings, tendencies and ideas due to past conditions and strips others of peculiarities due to local conditions. The residue become more vivid with each change, and gradually crystallizes into ideals. These ideals represent the goal of human progress—a condition where man's mastery over nature is complete. They become a social force by picturing an ideal society and inspiring a desire to make it real."²

III. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER (1840-1910).

LIKE Professor Patten, the late Professor William Graham Sumner was most widely known for his work in the field of economics. But he was also one of the two or three American pioneers in the field of sociology.³ He was the first American university teacher to introduce a systematic course on sociology into institutions of higher learning in this country. In his sociological methods he was most profoundly affected by Spencer and Lippert and followed chiefly the ethnographic procedure which characterized the approach of these two writers to sociological problems. Indeed, Sumner's one notable contribution to psychological sociology—his monumental *FOLKWAYS*—was developed from the field of ethnography and according to the ethnographic method. There is no doubt that Sumner regarded it as a contribution to ethnographic sociology rather than to psychological sociology.⁴ Sumner's two significant contributions to the psychological aspects of political and social theory were the development of a theory of the genesis of mores, customs, and folkways, with most thorough and illuminating historical and ethnographic illustrations, and the defence of the doctrine that the social process is an automatic affair which cannot be hastened, though it may be retarded, by human action.⁵ No extended analysis of Sumner's *FOLKWAYS* can be attempted within the scope of the present article, but it is essential that his fundamental conceptions be pointed out. As the subtitle of his work indicates,

¹THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, Chaps. iv.-v.; NEW BASIS OF CIVILIZATION; THE SOCIAL BASIS OF RELIGION, Chaps. iii., xiii.-xv.; THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY, pp. 94f.

²THEORY OF SOCIAL FORCES, pp. 133-4.

³I have summarized the social and political theories of Sumner in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, July, 1919.

⁴Cf. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. XV., p. 209.

⁵The following summary of the two chief contributions of Sumner is taken with slight revision from my above mentioned article in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, pp. 7-10.

it is "a study of the sociological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals." The work is essentially an attempt to explain the origin, nature, value, and persistence of certain of the most important and characteristic group habits. Briefly, Sumner's theory of the folkways is that, guided in a general way by the instincts which he inherited from his animal ancestors and by the psychophysical capacity to distinguish pain from pleasure, man has built up gradually, by a process of trial and error, certain types of group conduct which have been found by experience to be conducive to a successful issue of the struggle for existence. These group habits or *folkways* function primarily on a subconscious level and acquire greater power, as time passes, through the force of tradition, custom, and religious sanction. When the folkways reach the stage where they are raised to the level of conscious reflection and are regarded as essential to securing the continued welfare and prosperity of the group, they become thereby transformed into *mores*.¹ The mores, as supported by group authority, are the chief agency through which societal selection operates.² The mores determine what are to be regarded as right and wrong modes of conduct in any group, morality thus being not absolute and universal, but relative and local. The following selected and rearranged quotations from the *FOLKWAYS* epitomize Sumner's theoretical position:—

MEN in groups are under life conditions; they have needs which are similar under the state of the life conditions; the relations of the needs to the conditions are interests under the heads of hunger, love, vanity, and fear; efforts of numbers at the same time to satisfy interests produce mass phenomena which are folkways by virtue of uniformity, repetition, and wide concurrence. The folkways are attended by pleasure or pain according as they are well fitted for the purpose. Pain forces reflection and observation of some relation between acts and welfare. At this time the prevailing world philosophy suggests explanations and inferences, which become entangled with judgments of expediency. However, the folkways take on a philosophy of right living and life policy for welfare. When the elements of truth and right are developed into doctrines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane. They then become capable of producing inferences, developing into new forms, and extending their constructive influence over men and society. Then we call them the mores. The mores are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by them, and inherent in them, as they grow. They are the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions, codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them. By virtue of the latter element the mores are traits in the specific character of a society or a period. They pervade and control the ways of thinking in all the exigencies of life, returning from the world of abstractions to the world of action, to give guidance and to win revivification. At every turn we find new evidence that the mores can make anything right. What they do is that they cover a usage in dress, language, behaviour,

¹FOLKWAYS, pp. 2-4, 28-29, 30, 33-34, 59, 521-22.

²Ibid., pp. 173-74.

³Ibid., pp. 521-22.

manners, etc., with the mantle of current custom, and give it regulation and limits within which it becomes unquestionable. The limit is generally a limit of toleration. The mores set the limits or define the disapproval. The most important fact about the mores is their dominion over the individual. Arising he knows not whence or how, they meet his opening mind in earliest childhood, give him his outfit of ideas, faiths, and tastes, and lead him into prescribed mental processes. They bring to him codes of action, standards, and rules of ethics. They have a model of the man-as-he-should-be to which they mould him, in spite of himself and without his knowledge. If he submits and consents, he is taken up and may attain great social success. If he resists and dissents, he is thrown out, and may be trodden under foot. The mores are therefore an engine of social selection. Their coercion of the individual is the mode in which they operate the selection. It is vain to imagine that a "scientific man" can divest himself of prejudice or previous opinion, and put himself in an attitude of neutral independence towards the mores. He might as well try to get out of gravity or the pressure of the atmosphere. The most learned scholar reveals all the philistinism and prejudice of the man-on-the-curbstone when the mores are in discussion. The most elaborate discussion only consists in revolving on one's own axis. When the statesmen and social philosophers stand ready to undertake any manipulation of institutions and mores, and proceed upon the assumption that they can obtain data upon which to proceed with confidence in that undertaking, as an architect or engineer would obtain data and apply his devices to a task in his art, a fallacy is included which is radical and mischievous beyond measure.¹

IN addition to his notion of the mores, the other fundamental conception in Sumner's sociological theory was the assumption that social, as well as organic, evolution is almost entirely an automatic spontaneous process which cannot be extensively altered by social effort. In the light of Sumner's admitted obligation to Spencer it seems reasonable to suppose that this view of social development was either directly derived from the latter, or was strengthened by Spencer's vigorous exposition of this doctrine, particularly in his *STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY*. The following passage is the best summary of Sumner's views on the subject of the automatic evolution of society and the futility of social initiative:—

If this poor old world is as bad as they say, one more reflection may check the zeal of the headlong reformer. It is at any rate a tough old world. It has taken its trend and curvature and all its twists and tangles from a long course of formation. All its wry and crooked gnarls and knobs are therefore stiff and stubborn. If we puny men by our arts can do anything at all to straighten them, it will be only by modifying the tendencies of some of the forces at work, so that, after a sufficient time, their action may be changed a little and slowly the lines of movement may be modified. This effort, however, can at most be only slight, and it will take a long time. In the meantime spontaneous forces will be at work, compared with which our efforts are like those of a man trying to deflect a river, and these forces will have changed the whole problem before our interferences have time to make themselves felt. The great stream of time and earthly things will sweep on just the same in spite of us. It bears with it now all the errors and follies.

¹FOLKWAYS, pp. 30, 33-34, 59, 97-98, 173-74, 521-22.

of the past, the wreckage of all the philosophies, the fragments of all the civilizations, the wisdom of all the abandoned ethical systems, the débris of all the institutions, and the penalties of all the mistakes. It is only in imagination that we stand by and look at and criticize it and plan to change it. Everyone of us is a child of his age and cannot get out of it. He is in the stream and is swept along with it. All his sciences and philosophy come to him out of it. Therefore the tide will not be changed by us. It will swallow up both us and our experiments. It will absorb the efforts at change and take them into itself as new but trivial components, and the great movement of tradition and work will go on unchanged by our fads and schemes. The things which will change it are the great discoveries and inventions, the new reactions inside the social organism, and the changes in the earth itself on account of changes in the cosmical forces. These causes will make of it just what, in fidelity to them, it ought to be. The men will be carried along with it and be made by it. The utmost they can do by their cleverness will be to note and record their course as they are carried along, which is what we do now, and is that which leads us to the vain fancy that we can make or guide the movement. That is why it is the greatest folly of which a man can be capable, to sit down with a slate and pencil to plan out a new social world.¹

(To be continued.)

¹"The Absurd Attempt to Make the World Over," written in 1894 and reprinted in *WAR AND OTHER ESSAYS*, pp. 195-210; Cf. Spencer, *STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY*, pp. 270-71.

CIVIC IDEALS: SOME PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: by Barbara Low.

It will probably appear the merest truism, sheer wasting of time, to say that no theories of an ideal state, the claims and obligations of the citizen in that state, can be grounded in reality without understanding and consideration of human impulses and motivation. Nevertheless, such theories are always being promulgated without reference to, or in gross misconception of such considerations. Again and again the manifestations of mankind with which we are all familiar are overlooked, and still more those subtle and complex manifestations of the unconscious which reveal—if we can interpret rightly—some of man's most urgent dynamic desires. It is obvious that Psycho-Analysis, which has revealed to us so much of the hitherto unknown and concealed psyche, will be of the greatest assistance in any investigation as to conduct, individual or collective, and must be called in if we would get beyond the realms of Fantasy into contact with Reality. Freud has shown us that Fantasy is an inevitable concomitant in the development of humanity with a valuable rôle to play, even in the direction of adapting man to external and internal reality. But it is necessary, in the interests of adult harmonized life, to recognise what is Fantasy and to prevent it from usurping the place and functions of Reality. The very conception of an ideal civic life, a Utopia of some sort, is one manifestation of fantasy—the infantile wish for complete and lasting joy, for the "good times" never to change, and the infantile fear of unwelcome developments and possible disaster.

THE idea of man completely adapting his external circumstances to suit his convenience and pleasure, completely harmonized with his fellow-man, eliminating all waste, disorder and ugliness, creating in short a "Golden Age," expresses an unconscious fantasy which may tend to obscure realisation of the true situation.

INDIVIDUAL complexes must necessarily play their part, in addition, in the creation of every fantasy, and we can often see them at work if we have understanding of the unconscious. The civic idealist may have, all unconsciously, "an axe to grind," that is to say his ideals are not moulded primarily by a realized objective standard, but by his own unknown, unfulfilled impulses which seek gratification by this method. It is, then, of first importance for the idealist to be aware of his own complexes in order to discriminate between that which is valid in relation to reality and for the mass of mankind, and that which serves to rebut a hated, feared reality, providing an escape into a fantasy world. It is too often the weakness of such theorists that they are incapable of this discrimination; they start with the "ought to be," ignoring too greatly "what is." It is impossible in the brief space obtainable to do more than touch upon a few of the most striking examples of subjectivity as shown in civic theories and ideals: such a slight description, however, may serve to indicate the difficult problems to be grappled with, and possibly the lines along which we might evolve conceptions which would have sufficient validity to be realizable.

THE idealist-reformer may be regarded as an individual in whom sublimation has operated to a greater extent than in the mass of his fellow-men. His desire for the remote gain in place of the immediate, is itself a proof of differentiation, and the very sublimation of which he is capable may further alienate him from the average man. The researches of Freud have revealed that sublimation may involve loss as regards dynamic power in certain directions,

especially in regard to the primitive impulses. It is a question of balance. Too much gain in the direction of sublimation may spell too much loss in other directions : it has to be understood that "there are distinct limits set by nature to the extent to which sublimation is possible, and it is, above all, important to bear in mind that these vary enormously with different individuals." (Ernest Jones, *PAPERSON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS*, Second Edition, p.614). Probably this diminished force accounts for the tendency, so often strikingly displayed by the reformer, to underestimate what has been called "the bloody nature of man": he himself has unconscious motivation, due to his own inadequate psychic energy, for shunning and fearing that same "bloody nature." But leaving aside for the moment the consideration of sublimation, we are faced with the difficult problem of reaction-formations which often masquerade as sublimations. Through Psycho-Analysis the rôle played by the former in the development of character-traits is made evident, and further, we can discover in the reformer and idealist not infrequently the very complexes, disguised and inverted, against which his reforming efforts are unconsciously directed. A few instances may be given. The tolerance, benevolence, and general dislike of violence so often characterizing this type may be only the inverse of repressed sadistic trends, mere reaction-formations, and on that account weighted with unreasoning intensity and inadequate (*i.e.*, inappropriate) to the demands of reality. Such an example as Sir Thomas More, of *UTOPIA* fame, will at once jump to mind. As everyone remembers, no capital punishment, hardly any punishment of a physical kind, nor even mild severity, was permissible in his ideal Commonwealth (always excepting the treatment meted out to the slave-population due to war): the same attitude prevailed in his own private and social life. Yet More stands out prominently as an advocate of vindictive persecution of "heretics," surpassing even some other persecutors of his own day. The conclusion to be drawn is not that the views expressed in *UTOPIA* are unguine or un-beautiful but that the wide divergence between the two attitudes is a real explainable thing; the vindictive violence is compensatory to the extreme gentleness which latter was, at least in part, a reaction-formation to repressed sadism. Thus the *UTOPIA* remained a fantasy too out of touch with men's demands, especially that of self-assertion involving hostility; and More's sadism, unfulfilled in his fantasy and his personal life, must needs find an outlet in a persecution-mania. To take a more modern instance, *EREWHON*, Samuel Butler's *Utopia*, displays the same dislike of force, and a good deal of smiling tolerance towards mankind, yet no one who is acquainted with Butler's career and with his more personal work will doubt that cruelty and hostile impulses played a large part in his make-up.

If we look for another prominent characteristic of the Utopia-maker it is to be seen in his passionate desire for unity in sentiment and action, for fraternal co-operation in the community. This again may be due to reaction formation; in part it expresses the infantile desire to be protected, sheltered, closed round by the family: in part, an expression of the identification-desire which brings extension to the ego: yet again, it serves as a defence against the operation of jealousy and fear of superiors. That some measure of unity may be attained in a human community is obvious: the important matter is an awareness of the subjective motivation which demands an exaggerated and unattainable amount. The ideal of "freedom," often a fetish devoid of real significance, may express the measure of unconscious inferiority-feeling, of hatred of authority, and of sadistic desire to limit and restrain others. The reputed saying of a notable Calvinist divine neatly expresses such a psychic situation: "I give you good tidings, my brothers and sisters,

each one of you is purified of his sins and made free by the blood of the Lord, and if there be any in this congregation who refuses this truth, may the Lord strike him dead before my eyes." Such a crudity is easy to interpret, and to ridicule; not so the more subtle disguises by means of which unfulfilled unconscious desires, egoistic and sexual, can disport themselves as seekers after freedom. The desire for power (itself an outcome maybe of an inferiority-sense and a hostility to the powerful) is very usually a trait in the idealist and the reformer, much disguised and unknown to consciousness. The special form of his fantasy—a re-moulding of the State or Community into a shape of his own making—indicates the presence of this power-desire, even though he be willing to sacrifice, to spend, to subordinate himself for the welfare of others. Such a situation has its evils as well as its magnificence, and in this connexion certain words of Bertrand Russell are noteworthy: "I mean by 'the mechanistic outlook' . . . something which I for my part consider very evil. What I mean is the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy." If we consider what is the validity and purpose of any civic ideal, great or small, we shall perhaps have to answer thus: the securing of the most effective method for affording sublimation of primitive impulses (primarily sexual) into desires and purposes which are adapted to the collective community and its good. But such an achievement (*i.e.*, securing the most effective method of sublimation) can only be carried out when we have made answer to certain problems, chief among which are the following: First, along what lines does sublimation proceed? Secondly, can the process be directly guided or controlled? Thirdly, what compensations can be obtained for the repressions necessarily involved in an adaptation to civic ideals? These three questions raise a host of complicated problems concerning which nothing can here be said beyond a very few words, but I submit that until they are to some degree answered—at present we can hardly do more than posit them—civic ideals and theories must remain in the realm of fantasy. It is certain that without a knowledge of the unconscious and its mechanism the problems involved cannot be solved. It is here that Psycho-Analysis offers us hope and guidance, since by means of Psycho-Analytic research we can investigate unconscious motivation and the development of the individual, and thus begin to answer our first question—along what lines does sublimation proceed? One fundamental consideration to be kept in mind in this connexion is as follows: the unconscious process of sublimation is a matter of displacement of the energy connected with one idea or aim unto another, but the later activity is an indirect means of gratifying the original desire. Dr. Ernest Jones has expressed the matter thus: "The exchange of the secondary social aim for the original sexual one constitutes not so much a replacement of the one by the other as a diverting of the original energy into a fresh direction; the occurrence is, in fact, better described by the term displacement than by that of replacement. It is important here to keep in mind that it is the same affect, or desire, that is operative in the two cases; it is not a replacement of one interest by another, but a displacement of a given affect from one idea to another, from the first interest to the second." The bearing of this is clear, especially when we realise that, to quote again from PAPERS ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, "the process of sublimation is much more a matter of childhood mentality than of adult . . . in fact, the weaning of the child to external and social interests and considerations, which is the essence of sublimation, is perhaps the most important single process in the whole of education." We realize that sublimation achieves itself through the process of education (in its widest sense) by means of an "accurate and

specific transference of energy from one given field of interest to another : each special later interest corresponds with a special primary component of the sexual instinct." And this again will give some indication of an answer to the third question already put—what compensations can be obtained for the repressions necessarily involved in adaptation to a civic ideal? We can gain some idea as to what may be those compensations by keeping in mind the fact stated above, namely, that "an accurate and specific transference of energy from one given field of interest to another" is the route by which sublimation accomplishes itself, and therefore the compensations must be such as to allow sufficient energy to be expended on the later field of interest and such as to form sufficient link, stage by stage, between the primary and secondary interests. If this is possible to contrive in the training and education of the child, as so it seems, when we realize more completely the primary interests and tendencies of the child and so learn how to link on to these new tendencies we aim at developing, the second question of our three is answered, at least in part.

ANY idealist theory of communal or national life offers, to some extent, an opportunity for sublimation, but too often errs in affording inadequate compensation for repression. If we glance at some of the chief repressions and the spheres in which they operate, it will be clear that there is great difficulty in the matter. The ego-impulse with its narcissistic component may fail to get adequate gratification in a community where equality of status prevails, where personal achievement gains little recognition, where service is obligatory. The sadistic impulse may find difficulty in obtaining expression in adequate degree in a highly-organised, peaceful, ordered community where all violence is removed from daily existence. The removal of authority, the giving of "freedom," the placing of control in the individual's own hands (such as we see in some modern Educational experiments) do not necessarily adequately fulfil the desire for authority and the wish for subordination (sadistic and masochistic impulses). If these gratifications, and many others, are not to be fulfilled to some extent in compensatory form, the social system will not be appropriate, for no sublimation will entirely eliminate such fundamental desires and aims. Psycho-Analysis, therefore, can point a way by which we shall, if not yet, certainly in the future, be able to devise a social framework which shall more adequately offer opportunity for sublimation of primitive impulses, but the first requisite is a knowledge and understanding of those impulses and the path they must pursue towards sublimation. Without that requisite any civic ideal is indeed a "Utopia"—a land of nowhere!

I SHOULD like to discuss the question of what might constitute some form of Civic Education, but want of space makes this impossible. The teaching of "Civics" as we know it to-day seems unable to afford such an education, mainly on the ground that it does not sufficiently link on to primitive impulses nor offer means of sublimation : it is largely abstract and necessarily impersonal in a community of our modern type—a "civic life" in miniature, as carried out in Professor Stanley Hall's interesting account (narrated in *THE STORY OF A SAND PILE*) is still an artificial "play" enterprise, even though it has its merits. As Professor Geddes has so often shown us, a civic life can only emerge as a natural growth, a development of the people who make up the community.

BARBARA LOW.

COMMUNICATIONS.

SOCIOLOGY AND THEOLOGY.*

PROFESSOR ELLWOOD's industry is remarkable. It seems but the other day that he was spending his Sabbatical year amongst us, so vivid an impression did he leave behind. Yet here is the second large and important work from his pen, since he returned to those academic duties, which, combining administrative labours with lecturing and teaching, so often make the American professoriate a crippling occupation.

In the preface to his new book, Professor Ellwood cites Mr. Frederick Harrison and Mr. G. Lowes Dickenson among a list of representative thinkers, who insist that the supreme need of Western civilization is for some form of religious renewal. He ranges himself with such thinkers, but precisely defines the needed renewal as a "more rational, revitalized, socialized Christianity." His thesis is that "it is only a Christianity of this sort, which is equal to the task of saving modern civilization and of harmonizing its warring interests, classes, nations, races." The practical question then is first how to revise Christianity in these terms, and next how to get the revised version accepted as the working doctrine of every-day life in Western civilization. To the first of these two issues this book is in the main addressed. And it is perhaps in a long central chapter entitled POSITIVE CHRISTIANITY, THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY, that the reader can get quickest to the heart of Professor Ellwood's contribution. He accepts Comte's use of the word "positive" as being practically endorsed by modern science, *i.e.*, it is taken to mean data founded upon verified knowledge, not upon opinions or speculation.

PROFESSOR ELLWOOD specifies certain definite transformations as required in current or traditional forms of Christianity, in order that it may become positive. In the first place, theological and metaphysical questions without being excluded, must be reduced to a minor place. Other considerations, especially those of the practical life, must be put in the foreground. Right conduct, for instance, in the everyday life of man to man must be rated as something far more vital than theological doctrine. The collective and communitary aspect of life, as against the individual aspect, must be emphasized, since it is only in and through a "redeemed" community that the individual can come to fullness of personality. An ideal human society, or Kingdom of God upon earth, is presupposed in the perfection of individual life, but it cannot be assumed to result from a mere adding together of individual "conversions." The active life of good deeds must be so organized that the Church militant be itself put in a position to offer "moral substitutes" for war. No detail of everyday affairs can be considered as outside the range and influence of Christian idealism. Therefore the negative commands, inhibitions, and indifferences of traditional religion should be replaced by definite affirmations and concrete schemes of action. There must be fullest recourse to the evocatory synergies of team-play. The Church must see to it that organizations are promoted, maintained and developed for definitely and actually realizing the Kingdom of heaven on earth. But this does not mean Socialism. On the contrary, freedom and opulence of personality, throughout all ranks and classes without distinction of sex or occupation, will be desired and cultivated in positive Christianity more than ever before.

*THE RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIGION: A SOCIOLOGICAL VIEW, by Charles E. Ellwood, Department of Sociology, University of Missouri, Author of "The Social Problem," etc. The Macmillan Co., New York.

FROM these practical considerations, Professor Ellwood passes to discussion of the theological beliefs which would be consonant with a positive or scientifically grounded Christianity. From this standpoint he treats of belief in God, in immortality, in the reality of sin and of salvation from sin. In fact he shirks none of the major issues of speculative theology. Positive Christianity, he affirms, "has room for a very decided belief in God, a God who manifests himself in Nature, not only as creative evolution, but in human nature and human society, as the spirit leading towards all truth, all rightness, and all brotherhood." Instead of fine-spun theological dogmas concerning God, we may expect from positive Christianity a simple presentation of the Deity concept as involving a belief that "the creative force of the universe stands in a fatherly relation to us." Next in regard to the immortality concept, the conclusion is that the positive idea of God necessitates belief in personal immortality as an objective as well as a subjective fact. "In what precise form this personal immortality is realized will not concern positive Christianity—and it will refuse to waste time in quest of proof of that which, if proved, would add nothing of value to the Christian life." As to sin and salvation, Professor Ellwood says "sin is essentially selfishness; it is disloyalty to the claims of humanity, whether that humanity be our fellow human beings round us, or those in distant lands or future ages." What then of the meaning and significance of redemption? The first need is to free the idea of salvation from the theological shroud which wraps it in dressings remote from the simple teaching of the Gospels. Positive Christianity will dissociate salvation from the notion of escaping the penal consequences of sin, and seeking assurance of bliss in a life beyond the grave. "It will not deny that human souls may be lost and in torment on account of sin, for that would be to deny an obvious fact of moral and religious experience. But it will emphasize that salvation means, not only deliverance from sin, but entrance into the joy of a life of love, of service, and of right relations with one's fellow men Actively, salvation will reveal itself by participation in all those movements and activities which are designed to redeem humanity. Such groups as the Church and the family, and, possibly, also the State when it shall become Christian, are the necessary and natural media by which individuals are saved; and hence positive Christianity will preach a salvation for groups as well as for individuals." For final illustration of Professor Ellwood's outlook, range, and mode of handling, take his treatment of prayer. He declares that "the experience of religious persons testifies universally to the efficacy of prayer, and no positive religion based upon the facts of life will deny this." But precisely in what sense is prayer efficacious? The answer is that it is efficacious in so far as used in order to establish habitual intercourse between man and the ideals of life. "God becomes the Great Companion only to the extent that conversation with him is maintained. Inasmuch as prayer means the social energizing of the personality through a sense of communion with the divine, it is something that increases with the higher evolution of religion rather than decreases. In Christianity the ideal is that the whole of life shall become a prayer in the sense that the inner personal life shall be ever kept in constant communion with the divine."

IN addition to the chapter on Positive Christianity from which the above citations are made, there are ten other chapters in the book. They include one on our "Semi-Pagan Civilization," others on the relation of Religion to Family Life, to Political Life, to Social Pleasure. And the book winds up with a long chapter which sets out "the opportunity of the Church." No other institution or combination can, he declares, do what it is open

to the Church to do in the way of social redemption, if only it will fully and freely use its two master instruments, which are the Christian Gospels and Social Science.

PROFESSOR ELLWOOD has produced a notable work which may mark, ought to mark, a new departure in sociology. He sustains from beginning to end of his long treatise, judicious alternations of a common-sense attitude towards transcendental things, and a transcendental attitude towards common-sense things. That is a feat not only of insight and knowledge, but also of courage. For he risks, all the time, the brickbats of theologians, almost invariably resentful of common-sense interpretations of their "mysteries"; and also of scientists, almost invariably scornful of any touch of mysticism in the interpretation of common things. It is perhaps fear of the horns of this dilemma as much as anything else that has so long kept sociologists from applying to the Christian culture that treatment, at once thorough-going, frank, critical, appreciative, by which they have learned or are learning to understand and interpret the religious cultures of lower origins. Now that Professor Ellwood has broken through this stout fence of a scientific tabu, it may be hoped that others will take their courage in their hands, and follow so stirring an example of systematic research and penetrative interpretation. The "higher criticism" of their own sacred texts by theologians themselves has long passed from the destructive to the constructive stage. Thus the situation is fully ripe for the sociologist to intervene in the re-adaptation of religious culture to modern needs by bringing to bear such apparatus as his science commands for the sifting, refining, valuing of the strangely mingled Christian heritage.

How far can Professor Ellwood's readings, interpretations, conclusions, be accepted as at least provisional findings of sociology, and so be given a certain status in the historic problem of inter-relation between science and religion? That is the difficult question which his book raises. In broad outline his presentation of the case will perhaps stand the test of time. The gist of his case is this: that the scheme of life-values and civilization-values enunciated in the three synoptic Gospels is one that social science will confirm, when it sets itself seriously to the great problem of Purpose and the means of Attainment. Amongst the evidence adduced to show that sociology is moving in this direction, Professor Ellwood makes considerable use of L. T. Hobhouse's later books, in which he declares theologians will find not a little support—when they discover their existence. Any criticism, to be adequate, would have to treat in detail the major propositions of Professor Ellwood's thesis and submit them to examination one by one. Having so far spoken of the qualities of his book, let us take a sample proposition which appears to exhibit its defects. Professor Ellwood claims that there is room in a scientifically grounded religion for belief in an objective immortality of the soul. Now enquire, where, in point of fact, is found in the field of science, any concept capable of being imaged as objective immortality, and the answer can hardly be in doubt. Biologists postulate a potency of objective immortality in the life of the protozoa; and in the seeds of plants and in the germplasm of metazoan animals the same conditional potency might be affirmed. As biologists see and declare it, the death of the organism is the price paid for life's step upwards from the simplicity of one-celled existence to the many celled complexity of an organized body. From these concepts of biology we cannot break loose without passing from the field of life-science; though that passage may possibly be into some other legitimate domain of experience or speculation. It is possible that the higher forms of life we call mind and spirit may be treated in the light of experiences which cannot as yet be

definitely brought within the categories of science. But so long as we make observations and pursue research which we wish to call scientific, we are bound to postulate the unity of body, mind, and spirit as aspects of the one form of life known to science. If therefore a sociologist affirms an objective survival of spirit after death, he is bound, as sociologist, to frame a hypothesis which associates such spirit with a correlative life of mind and body. Further, he is compelled by the canons of science to show, by means of a plausible hypothesis, the precise kind of environment to which the post-mortem life of spirit, mind and body is adapted; for science, as such, knows life only as organism in definite interaction with environment. Organism, Function and Environment (or as the Le Play sociologists say, Place, Work, Folk) are the terms of a series with which the scientific student of life works, by the conditions of his metier. Let him omit any single term of the triad, and he may possibly still be observing well and speculating usefully, but his activities have passed from science into some other field, of relation thereto, at present unknown. The fact is that Professor Ellwood, in affirming personal immortality as something not unsupported by life-science (and in several other of his propositions) reflects unwittingly that sterilizing tradition, which, departing from Comte's linkage of sociology with biology, has attached the science of society to a more or less metaphysical view of mind and spirit, under the illusion that a valid psychology could thus be built up. There probably is the "damnable legacy" which persistently keeps sociologists away from what would seem to be the primary problem of their science, *i.e.*, the precise correlation and interaction of the social process, with the mental process and the organic process, as all of them aspects of the life process. Until they can make an acceptable presentation of social life thus correlated, sociologists must expect to remain the pariahs of the scientific world.

THE STAGES OF HUMAN LIFE.*

ARE there stages in personal mundane existence, and if so have they any practical value as a guide to the ordering of individual life?

It has for ages been a matter of common observation that the individual goes through a series of body and mind changes correlated with the maturing and ageing processes. Consequently the conception of human life as having its stages has been formed by many philosophers, professed and otherwise.

BUT the stages so discerned have been no more than very generalised pictures of the characteristic appearance and behaviour of the individual at different periods in his life history, statements of observable alterations in bodily capacity and associated mental disposition and habit which take place as the years accumulate; they exhibit life simply as an inevitable incline and decline, unaffected by the history (development or neglect) of the inner consciousness, of the actual self, and their interest, therefore, was curious or academic, rather than practical.

THE average man has been no wiser than the philosophers. To-day, he still views mental life as an undiversified plateau, reached by an initial upward climb represented by the two decades prior to the attainment of adulthood. He sees life, of course, as marked by external events and by a general increase in responsibilities and a decrease in bodily—and usually mental—powers, but he does not see it as a procession of inherent opportunities. He envisages the outside world as a field to be cultivated for his own or others benefit,

*THE STAGES OF HUMAN LIFE, by J. Lionel Tayler, M.R.C.S. John Murray, 1921. (18s. net.)

but he does not conceive of his inner self as being similarly exploitable, each vital season having its appropriate operations. Hence, for him, life's stages, if there are any, have not much relevance to the business of getting the most out of existence.

IN opposition to the common view, Dr. Tayler sees life as a continuous procession of stages, each distinguishable from the possession of special inherent potentialities for psychic development. Each epoch of life has its own psychic condition, which constitutes its particular opportunities for expansion, and according as there is use, misuse, or neglect of these opportunities the yield of life will be rich or poor. Hence the stages of life, their basis, and their character should form a study of the highest practical importance.

IF Dr. Tayler is right the study has a most material bearing upon modern problems of society, since no system of social life that the idealist might devise could succeed unless it were founded on a recognition of the natural developmental needs of the average individual life. Indeed, one is tempted to say that if individual life can realise itself the ideal form for society will automatically take shape. At all events, in an age like this, when the general tendency is to seek the betterment of human conditions mainly in the direction of modifications of the social structure, it is useful to have our attention directed to the fact that the individual holds his fate in his own hands to a far greater extent than is commonly acknowledged, for it warns us that social reforms will not succeed in rendering individual lives more contented unless there is an accompanying reform of the individual by himself, a truer orientation of the self to biological reality; such co-operation between society and the individual is indispensable for human advance.

THE truth that a profound physico-psychic change takes place in the organism about puberty which it is imperative to take into account in the guidance of youth through the periods of adolescence has, in a dim and inarticulate way, been recognised from the dawn of human culture, and latterly, thanks so largely to the labours of Stanley Hall, the study of adolescence has been placed on a scientific basis. The theory which Dr. Tayler advances is that while adolescence may be the most striking, and in some ways, the most important phase of individual life, it is only one of a series, a series covering the whole of life, and representing a continuous unfolding. He holds that if right use is made of the inherent capacities for mental development as they occur, life is a continuous psychic expansion from birth to old age; while if they are neglected it is unsatisfying, despite any advantages that wealth and position may confer. As a medical man, Dr. Tayler naturally does not fail to insist on the necessity for a due cultivation of the bodily powers as a physical basis for a healthy and expanding mind. Neither does he deny the importance of external circumstances, though he would say that their reaction on the individual was determined as much by the character of the mind as by their intrinsic favourableness or the reverse.

THE above seems to be a fair statement of the underlying idea of "The Stages of Human Life" and of its social implication, but the author nowhere crystallizes his thought in any such explicit terms. It is, indeed, a misfortune that in a book written from so novel a standpoint, and containing so much in support of that standpoint, the author should omit to tell the reader at the beginning precisely what he is driving at, and, also, should fail to keep him in mind throughout of the bearing, upon the main theme, of the voluminous evidence adduced.

ON account of this and other technical defects the book stands in some danger of failing to win the attention to which its subject matter and intrinsic

merit entitle it. If the general reader is likely to experience difficulty in catching the drift, the scientific reader, already, perhaps, a trifle irritated by the initial lack of explicitness, is in some chance of being antagonised by the writer's not infrequent habit of dropping into a style which may be described as adapted to the comprehension of young people. Some impatience, too, will probably be felt at the lengthiness of the quotations prefacing many of the chapters, which do not reinforce the scientific exposition.

A PUBLISHER'S note commends the book primarily to "parents, teachers, nurses, and welfare workers, as well as to medical men," but notwithstanding the fact that it necessarily contains a good deal of biological and other commonplace, there is a large residuum of original thought which well repays detaching, from a sociological point of view.

IN attempting to define the stages of life in conformity with biological data Dr. Tayler was compelled to break away from all previous definitions. He claims that all his forerunners, philosophers or poets, Comte no less than Shakespeare, have been equally at sea regarding the true basis of life periods. THE author distinguishes nine stages in the post-natal life of the individual, *i.e.* :

1. NATENCY, comprising the first 5 to 8 days after birth.
2. INFANCY, extending to the 8th or 9th month.
3. WEANLINGHOOD, extending to about the middle of the 3rd year.
4. CHILDHOOD, extending into the 7th year.
5. PUBESCENCE, extending to about the 14th year, *i.e.*, to the onset of sexual activity.
6. ADOLESCENCE, extending to the cessation of height growth about the 18th year.
7. YOUTH, which is completed with adult weight equilibrium about the 25th year.
8. MATURITY, extending to about the 60th year, and which is divided into sub-periods designated by such forbidding names as (a) Novity, (b) Incorporativity, and (c) Individuancy (these three are noticed below).
9. OLD AGE, which may take one of four forms, according to the use and events of life, *i.e.*, (a) Senescence, or seeming deterioration of the mind; (b) Decrepitancy, or feebleness of mind; (c) Infirmary, or feebleness of body; (d) Veterancy, "where the body is adequate to healthy meditative mental needs of the mind," and which is of course to be desired as the ideal termination of life.

THE recognition and delimitation of these nine stages is based on the physiological and psychological events fundamental to the course of normal human life.

MUCH consideration is naturally bestowed upon the unfolding of the mind during immaturity, and there is an interesting reference to the probable dawning of sentiency during the latter half of the pre-natal period. Attention is called to the part played in early life by an inherent capacity for discernment, which has as its chief field the expressions and actions of people around, and the author considers that up to childhood the mind tends to be stored much more through discernment than as a result of any process of reasoning about things observed, hence the nature and conduct of those about a child have much more formative influence on character than direct instruction during the first five or six years of existence.

It would, however, have augmented the value of the study if in addition to tracing the various mental tendencies characterising different youthful stages, and the disposition and attitudes to life thereby resulting, those mental states had been correlated with associated evolution in the structure of consciousness. To say that "infants are mainly instinctive, weanlings instinctive and discerning, children discerning with slight manifestations of will and thought," does not carry one the whole way towards understanding the particular type of consciousness by which the evolving mind apprehends such external stimuli as are able at a given stage to engage its attention, and the mental processes by which it reacts, in behaviour. The greatest mental difference between the adult and the immature is the much greater share which is taken in the conscious life of the former by the superior controlling influence which we suppose to have developed co-incidentally with the evolution of the frontal region of the brain, and the peculiar changes in mentation which occur with ourselves when the control of the higher consciousness is relaxed, as in reverie, day-dreaming, dozing, and dreaming (which seem to represent temporary reversions to less evolved mechanisms of thought), are strongly suggestive that the modes of action of the non-adult mind at different stages of its growth must be on different evolutionary planes to that on which the active mind of the intelligent adult functions. If this be true an appreciation of the fact would be helpful, and indeed necessary, for the understanding of youthful behaviour and mental attitude.

DR. TAYLER insists that personal life is potentially progressive throughout, and that the realisation of this potentiality—which is so essential for the adequate utilization of whatever life may have to offer, and hence for the enjoyment of its rewards—depends upon the continuous development of personality or individuality throughout all life's stages—it is impossible wholly to pick up if one starts late or neglects a stage. Dr. Tayler makes it clear that by development of individuality he understands the utilization of one's inborn capacities along lines indicated by one's particular bent. The average man, however, always finds it difficult to see that this principle is not a sanction for anti-social conduct, while he is also much disposed to identify individuality with simple vigour of character, with a disposition to singularity in expression or behaviour, or with pronounced eccentricity, none of which, of course, are necessarily associated with a steady integration of individuality. On this account the plea for the natural progressiveness of personal life, provided the latent capacities for educability be utilised, would have been presented with greater force had Dr. Tayler represented personal development as being very intimately and inseparably connected with an expansion of consciousness, a widening of the whole content of the mind in such a way as to lead to a fuller and fuller apprehension of knowable phenomena, and had he shewn that expansion to be a principle universal through animal life, and fundamental to all human progress. Put in this way, the argument for self-fulfilment as the guiding principle of personal life would carry readier conviction.

PERHAPS the stages which have allowed the author the greatest opportunity for novel treatment are those of Maturity and Old Age. There has been an extraordinary neglect of the study of middle life, and the author, despite his wide reading, confesses himself unable to cite a single work treating of the mental and bodily characteristics of this very important period of life. Dr. Tayler envisages what is commonly regarded as the psychic dead level between youth and age as tending naturally to be a steady ascent towards a completer self-development. As already mentioned, he distinguishes three phases, one a kind of novitiate period, when the individual tends to be

opinionated and his interests somewhat indiscriminate; two, a time of settling down, facing realities, and of acceptance of responsibilities; and three, a time of making good the promise of earlier years, of "finding" oneself, of winning through to public recognition.

Much, of course, has been written about Old Age, but Dr. Tayler justly complains that scarcely anyone seems to have felt more than very dimly that this stage has its own constructive contribution to make to the sum of psychic life, nearly everyone picturing it as a time of mournful decay, the mind sharing in the decline of the body. Briefly stated, the view here suggested is that Age is a time when life's experiences, surveyed from a height and reviewed in relative detachment, are reintegrated into a new and richer product, so that Age is the crown, not the decline of life—if health has been sufficiently conserved. In Veterancy, at all events, is attained the summit of individuality; as regards senility and feebleness of mind, the author daringly asks whether we are right in judging by outward appearances, whether we can be sure that the mind is ever really obliterated in this life, an exceedingly debatable matter about which he wisely refrains from being positive.

REGINALD WELLBYE.

RURAL CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES.

[THE following account of a banking development in U.S.A. gives a vivid picture of rural economy, which calls insistently to be fitted into some definite niche of the sociological edifice. But just where and in what relation to the contents of the other niches? The difficulty of fitting this sketch of rural economy into the larger picture of the social whole, well illustrates the backward condition of descriptive sociology. It is for lack of systematic description of representative aspects that we fall short of a vision of the social whole. Yet without some approximate vision or theory of the whole, we cannot select those aspects which are vital, and present them as parts of a unity. It is this dilemma which, above all else, hinders the progress of a general social science. The difficulty comes sharply to a point in reference to banking; for there is perhaps no other aspect of our current society in the western world that is more deeply representative of the dominant culture of the times. Yet we have no formula which definitely relates the banking process to the social process. In other words, the situation is this: the theory of banking in the books on economics (so far as they have one), stands in vague and ambiguous relation to the theory of social evolution and organisation in the books on sociology (so far as they have one).

IN a conversation on the working of the Federal Reserve System with Mr. F. J. Lisman, of New York, during his recent visit to London, the unusual fact of credit initiation in the rural community came out, and he was induced to put it down in writing. It is a case of rural credit organisation standing in direct relation to the main banking system, not indirectly as is the way with the co-operative credit societies we know in Europe.—EDITORS.]

WHILE there are no mutual Banks or Associations in the United States to help the farmer with his requirements for raising a crop, these needs are taken care of in another way.

THERE are about 35,000 Banks in the United States, most of which belong to the Federal Reserve System. There are Banks in practically every agricultural community where the existence of a Bank can be justified; for example, there are many agricultural communities in the State of Pennsylvania which have Banks of a capital of \$25,000 (£5,000). Such a Bank may have deposits of \$150,000 (£30,000) and in nearly all cases its Capital Stock would be entirely owned by the farmers living in the adjacent community. Frequently the Board of Directors of such a Bank would meet at 8 o'clock on the morning of market-day—whether it be on a Monday or a Saturday. Necessarily the date and hour of the Directors' Meeting is fixed to suit the greatest number of the Directors. All requests for loans or discounts are discussed at the Directors' weekly meeting. If Farmer

Jones wants to borrow \$500 in the month of March, for the purpose of buying a new plough, or mule or seed, his request would be passed upon by men who knew him and his requirements personally.

MR. JONES, no doubt, would have to give a six months' Note, which he would be expected to pay out of the proceeds of his crop in the Fall. If the little Bank that is called the Farmers' National Bank of Cornwall, should need more money before the Note is paid, it can take Jones' Note to the Federal Reserve Bank, and have it re-discounted at the Bank rate.

UNDER the law, the Federal Reserve Bank discounts any Note for its members which is based on merchandise transactions having more than three months to run, and if based on farmers' needs, must not have more than six months to run, and his Notes must be endorsed by the Bank. In times of great demand for money the Federal Reserve Bank regulates the demands on it, firstly by advancing the Discount Rate, and secondly by prorating or rationing money to its members; that is to say it may promulgate a Rule to the effect that no Bank shall have the right to discount an amount of Notes greater than a sum equal to twice its Capital Stock, or any amount borrowed beyond that will have to pay a higher rate of discount.

THIS system has worked quite effectively, and in the nature of things, tends to stability. Of course it cannot, and is not intended, to take care of farmers in case they do not want to sell their crops, when there is a serious drop in the price of their products. The Federal Reserve system was not conceived for the purpose of carrying any commodities on speculation, but merely to facilitate and expedite production and distribution of all kinds of commodities and merchandise.

A SEPARATE institution, the Federal Land Bank, which is very much along the lines of European Land Banks, was instituted some years ago to take care of the Mortgage requirements of the farmer; and the matter of carrying commodities of any kind, and a rise in price, must necessarily be left to negotiations between the owners and the Banks.

THROUGH the small local Banks and their larger associations direct social reactions of an experimental kind are sometimes attempted. For example, last year the Association of South Eastern Bankers resolved that no loans should be made by its members to any farmer who would not raise enough produce substantially to feed his family, himself and his animals. The theory of this is that a farmer should not put himself into the position of having to pay cash to some other community for the purpose of paying for hay, flour, potatoes, etc., when he could more cheaply raise these things himself. Similarly Banks offer prizes to farmers who exhibit the best cattle or hogs at the County Fair. Many counties have Boys' Clubs and Girls' Clubs where prizes are given to the boy who raises the greatest number of bushels of corn to the acre, or to the girl who gets the greatest number of eggs from a given number of chickens, etc.

SUCH endeavours promote an interest in rural economy, and attendance at Agricultural Colleges is markedly on the increase.

F. J. LISMAN.

ART AND SOCIETY.

IN the last number of the REVIEW Mr. Constable has stated—with some reservations it is true—the case for the independence of the individual artistic genius in the century-old debate on the relations of Art to Society. Certainly this has been the dominant conception since the days of the Renaissance when men first began to theorize about Art, and it has a special attraction in our modern industrial societies where Art is usually thought of

either as a refuge from life, or as the privilege of a cultured minority. Of late years, however, there has been a marked reaction against the aristocratic individualism that was so trenchantly expressed by Whistler, and it would be easy to find defenders of the social view of Art among the present generation of English critics. The following passage, however, which I quote from André Chevrillon's last book on Morocco seems to me to put this thesis more clearly than anything I have read by a professed critic of art.

"THE individuality of a particular people," he says, "expresses itself in the order of beauty by that which we call style or character, that character which strikes us in everything which bears the impress of the hand of an Egyptian of antiquity or a Chinese of any age, that spontaneous style which is found in all the works—one may say in all the modes—of a civilisation and manifests its general and peculiar tendency, its cohesion, its spiritual unity, its interior logic."

Thus in Morocco "the style of the civilisation is everywhere; it is the mark set on every human object throughout the generations by the very genius of the society. It is to be found in the rude pottery of the market place no less than in the precious chasing of a dagger. One may say that it is found in the man himself, in his admirably delicate gestures, so different to our own, testifying to the discipline and measure which a true civilisation imposes."*

THIS is of course most obvious in the case of a simple unified state of society, such as we find in modern Islam or in our own Middle Ages, but it is essentially true of all Art. A great art is the expression of a great society, as much as of a great individual, or rather it is the expression of a great society *through* a great individual. Mr. Constable remarks that a committee has never painted a great picture, but it is surely undeniable that great works of art are often the expressions of a corporate tradition. Take the Homeric poems, or the Gothic Cathedrals. Of the latter Professor Lethaby writes: "The work of a man, a man may understand; but these are the work of ages, of nations . . . They are serene, masterly, non-personal like works of nature," and the same may be said of the great achievements of religious art all over the world—in ancient India and Ceylon, in Buddhist China and Java, in the Byzantine churches and the early Syrian mosques—where the personal element is merged in an ancient and impersonal tradition.

NOR is it difficult to correlate, for example, the artistic outburst of the Gothic period with the other manifestations of the mediæval genius, whether in thought or action. The rise of Gothic architecture corresponds both in time and place with that of the communal movement in north western Europe, so that it is hardly an exaggeration to speak of it as the art of the French communes. So too with the development of mediæval philosophy. This—like mediæval architecture—falls naturally into two periods, the second of which, like Gothic, attains its full development in the middle of the 13th century and in the North of France. It is true we cannot trace that anyone of these movements is the cause of the others. Each of them is autonomous and follows its own law of life. Yet each is but an aspect of a real unity—that common social effort which we call mediæval civilisation.

AFTER the Renaissance when European civilisation becomes increasingly complex, and art is dominated by individualism on the one hand and the rules of formal criticism on the other, its social character naturally becomes less obvious. Yet even the spirit of individualism itself is a characteristic social trait of the period, and the attempt to regulate life according to abstract

* A. Chevrillon, MARRAKECH, pp. 376. 378.

rational canons obtains in politics and thought no less than in art. In this as in other things art is the faithful mirror of society.

MOREOVER, under the cosmopolitan veneer of this conformity to the canons of criticism, society continues to exercise a deep subconscious influence on the mind of the artist and the poet. The great individual artist, Leonardo da Vinci or Velasquez, is essentially the great Italian or the great Spaniard; each expresses that which is deepest and most characteristic in the mind of the people and the age from which he springs. When a man seems to escape from all such categories and to be a stranger in his age, it is usually because he is a stranger in literal fact—one who brings his social past with him into an alien environment; like Theotocopuli the Cretan, who learned his craft from the great Venetians, and developed his individual genius in the theocratic and mystical atmosphere of Philip II.'s Spain, yet remained to the last essentially "El Greco," the Byzantine Greek. So too with the typical "deracinés" of 19th century literature. Heine, half German, half Parisian, but at bottom a Jew; Tolstoi, the Russian noble who revolted against the Franco-German cosmopolitan civilisation of Petersburg, and went back (went *home* perhaps) to the Russia of the Raskol; even George Bernard Shaw, the Irishman in London and Henry James, the New Englander who rediscovered Europe. All these were in their time powerful influences of fermentation and change, just because they were able to see life with eyes alien to those of the society in which they lived, and thus fertilised the mind of one people by a perhaps unrealised contact with the soul of another. They talked the language of the people with whom they dwelt, but their deeper thoughts and instincts were those of the people from whom they came. C.D.

ECONOMICS OF MATERNITY AND CHILD WELFARE WORK.

AT the present time, when the nation is passing under a phase of unusual economic stress, and when, at the same time, the great propaganda movement of the National Baby Week Council to promote maternity and child welfare work, is before the public, one's thoughts turn very naturally to the economic aspects of the matter. In these days there is a feeling that every penny of national money spent must be justified in its expenditure. It is well, therefore, to look into the economics of maternity and child welfare work. The contention here put forward is that (accepting the present economic system with its financial standards) expenditure on infant welfare justifies itself.

WITHOUT going any further back than the beginning of this century, striking figures are available from our national statistics. In the year 1900, no systematic arrangements for the care of mothers and children by local authorities existed. For every 1,000 babies born in the year, 154 died under the age of twelve months.

As time went on local authorities had begun to make certain provision for maternity and child welfare work in connection with their public health activities, and during the year 1914 municipal expenditure on maternity and child welfare work was definitely provided for by grants from the Treasury. In the year 1914 there were about 600 health visitors and 250 infant welfare centres, and the infant death rate was 105 per 1,000 births—a considerable reduction on the rate at the beginning of the century.

FURTHER developments are indicated by the following table:—

Year.	Equivalent to Full-time Health Visitors.	Infant Welfare Centres.	Infant Deaths per 1,000 Births.
1914	600	250	105
1918	1,250	1,150	97
1920	1,550	1,780	85
1921	1,737	1,954	83

THE incidence of the disease diarrhœa, which is particularly fatal to children under two years of age, throws great light upon the value of maternity and child welfare and of public health activities. The year 1911 and the year 1921 are especially interesting for comparison, both being characterized by hot, dry summers, and were therefore likely to be visited by a severe epidemic of diarrhœa.

IN actual numbers, in 1911, 881,138 babies were born and 31,900 died under twelve months of age from diarrhœa. While in 1921, which had a longer and hotter summer, and in which the births numbered 849,045, only 11,705 babies died from this disease, that is to say, that for every 1,000 babies born, 36 died from diarrhœa in 1911, and only 14 in 1921.

OUR specialized expenditure on maternity and child welfare work, mostly out of rates and taxes, has increased year by year from £83,000 in 1914-15, to practically £1,900,000 in 1921-22—as shown in the following table:—

In 1914-15	..	£83,000	was spent.
1915-16	..	£136,000	" "
1916-17	..	£245,000	" "
1917-18	..	£438,000	" "
1918-19	..	£730,000	" "
1919-20	..	£1,345,000	" "
1920-21	..	£1,864,000	" "
1921-22	..	£1,900,000	(approximately)

and naturally, at this time, one desires to investigate as to whether this is worth while. The fall in the infant death rate is an indication of its worth whileness, particularly when each individual life of the population can be estimated in terms of pounds, shillings and pence. Sir Josiah Stamp, the well-known authority on such questions, estimates the value of each individual of the population in terms of pounds, shillings and pence to the nation to be in pre-war days, £313, and nowadays, to be somewhere in the neighbourhood of £500. Some interesting figures come from America. Professor Lewis M. Terman, of the Leland Stanford Junior University, has estimated the value of each individual unit of the population at different years of age in the United States. In terms of English money the following are his estimates:—

At birth	he puts down the value of an individual at	£20.
5 years of age	"	£200.
20	"	£800.
50	"	£600.

By further calculations he comes to the conclusion that the minimum average loss to society from each postponable death is £300. 42 per cent. of deaths in the United States are considered to be postponable, therefore the average loss to the State he reckons to be £200,000,000 per annum. Pursuing his calculations into the field of preventable illness he reckons that the loss from this source is £400,000,000 per annum, or four times the total expenditure on public education in the United States of America.

THESE figures apply to the United States of America. They would obviously have to be modified to bring them into line with English conditions, but

they give us a very good idea of the economic loss to the State incurred by early death and by preventable illness.

DR. EDGAR COLLIS, Professor of Preventive Medicine at the Welsh National School of Medicine, also gives a significant estimate :—

"ALLOW a health visitor a salary of £250 per year : this is the debit. If a health visitor only ensures that each year 50 children are carried in health through the first year of life, possibly at least 40 of them will become fairly healthy adults, wealth-producing units, each worth a wage of about £250 a year. The return by them to the State for her services would be about £10,000 a year. The total may not be placed to credit, because without her some would reach adult life with some earning capacity : but there is also to the credit side that healthy children cost less to rear, and make less call on our hospitals, sanitoriums and dispensaries. Balance the account how you will, and money spent on health visitors will be found a true economy."

NORAH MARCH.

THE LIFE OF CIVILISATIONS : a Note on Mr. Christopher Dawson's article.*

OF ALL the illuminating remarks which Mr. Christopher Dawson's lecture contains, none throw more light than two on the concluding page : (1) that the conditions of the solution of our present world problems lie in "the incorporation into the mind of society of the achievements of the past periods of Progress" : (2) that the "great task of the coming age is to promote a spiritual unity" based on the scientific and technical results of Western Civilisation but embracing the whole world.

IT IS in the light of this conclusion that I should judge and supplement his summaries of previous periods and phases of civilisation. If the goal for mankind is a unity based on the scientific progress of the West, plus the idea of spiritual unity in which all types of civilisation have a share, then we are bound to interpret earlier ages as they approach or contribute to this ideal. This is not to ignore the various factors, racial, geographical, etc., which Mr. Dawson describes, but it supplies a governing conception of civilisation under which the previous temporary and partial phases take their place. Is it not better to start with a general idea of what "civilisation" as a whole consists in, rather than to speak of "civilisations" as separate entities, rising, flowering, and dying away?

FROM this point of view "civilisation" must be regarded as the gradual extension of all human powers through the association of men together in larger and larger circles, the perfection of the individual man through the development of humanity. To this end all the partial phases may be seen to converge ; the East as well as the West contributes to science, all religions strengthen the bonds of social unity, and from the most primitive times man has been imposing himself upon nature. The great dislocations and set-backs may be generally best explained by one side, or one section, of mankind developing out of relation to the others ; e.g., Greco-Roman civilisation, being power based on reason, gives way for a time to an emotional synthesis—Christianity based on love ; the West in the recent period has tended to tyrannize over weaker peoples, because the latter had not developed the scientific side of their nature, and so on.

A DOCTRINE of rational hope leads us to believe that we are now on the road to draw these different sides together and advance harmoniously, as Mr. Dawson indicates in his concluding paragraphs.

F. S. MARVIN.

* Printed in the January, 1922, issue of the SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY, 1921-1922.

IN presenting the Annual Report for 1921-22 to the members of the Sociological Society the Council has pleasure in recording the progress made in various directions. The study groups have advanced in research in their respective fields; the monthly meetings have attracted the attention not only of members and friends of the Society, but of a much wider public; it has been possible to renew contact with those working at the Social Sciences in University centres, and also to develop new connections in the Universities with the possibility of useful co-operation in future.

It is, however, necessary to point out that the Council is hampered at every turn by the lack of funds. For this difficulty there would appear to be only two remedies:—

- (1) A largely increased membership;
- (2) Donations from members of the Society or from interested outsiders.

THE Council appeals very earnestly to the members for assistance in these two directions. If every member of the Society would endeavour to enlist outsiders, the increased membership (on the higher subscription rate now in force for new members) would materially ease the very difficult financial situation in which the Society is placed. It would also assure the Council of that sympathetic support which is essential if it is to carry out satisfactorily the important and difficult work which lies before it.

THE Council has to report the initiation of some new activities, and they have been fortunate enough to obtain the assistance of well-known scientists and public men at their monthly meetings. The Programme of meetings for the past year is as follows:—

AUTUMN TERM, 1921.

Oct. 25th. Preparations for the General Adoption of Town Planning: Mr. Raymond Unwin, F.R.I.B.A. Chairman: Mr. H. V. Lanchester.

Nov. 22nd. The Successors of Austria-Hungary: Some of their Problems: Dr. Seton Watson. Chairman: Mr. G. P. Gooch.

Dec. 20th. The Life of Civilisations: Mr. Christopher Dawson. Chairman: Mr. Alexander Farquharson.

WINTER TERM, 1922.

Jan. 24th. The Steel Industry of South Yorkshire: A Regional Study: Professor Cecil Desch. Chairman: Sir Francis Ogilvie.

Feb. 21st. Ireland Past and Future: Mr. George Russell ("A.E.") Chairman: The Lord Henry Cavendish Bentinck.

Mar. 4th. Art and Society: Mr. W. G. Constable. Chairman: Mr. J. C. Squire.

SUMMER TERM, 1922.

May 23rd. The National Housing Policy: A Commonsense View: Mr. Ernest Betham. Chairman: Mr. Ellgood.

June 13th. The Return of the Guilds: Mr. G. K. Chesterton. Chairman: Principal Ernest Barker.

July 4th. Regional and Vocational Influences on Architecture: Mr. Stanley C. Ramsey, F.R.I.B.A. Chairman: Mr. Victor Branford.

THE two meetings at the rooms of the Royal Society at which Dr. Seton Watson and Mr. George Russell spoke respectively on "The Successors of Austria-Hungary" and "The Past and Future of Ireland" were in continuation of a series on "Modern Political Developments," begun by Mr. H. J. Laski and continued by the Hon. Mr. Srinivasa Sastri last year.

THE Council desires cordially to thank all those who have assisted them at these meetings. Thanks are especially due to Mr. George Russell, who came to England to speak for the Society at a time when public events made it particularly difficult for him to do so.

RESEARCH COURSE.

IN addition to the Monthly Meetings a course of weekly lectures was given throughout the Autumn Term by Mr. Harold J. E. Peake on "The Evolution of the English Village Community." These lectures embodied the results of Mr. Peake's researches on this subject, and they have now been published in book form.

STUDY AND RESEARCH GROUPS.

(1) "LA SCIENCE SOCIALE" GROUP. The first piece of work undertaken by this group, namely, a collective translation of M. Demolins' "Comment la Route crée le Type Social" has been completed, and both volumes have now been roughly translated. Mr. Farquharson, the Chairman of the Group, and M. Jules Demolins have jointly undertaken the revision of this translation. It is hoped that during the coming year the group will undertake fresh work.

(2) SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY GROUP. The modern section of this group, under the direction of Mr. Shand, has been very active during the past year. A Questionnaire has been drawn up with a view to obtaining first-hand information on the changes that have taken place in family life since the last two generations. A considerable number of answers to this questionnaire has been received. It is proposed to begin a comparative study of the answers as soon as an equal number of those from the older and the younger generation can be obtained. The Questionnaire has already proved of value as a method of studying the salient characteristics of family life, and as an initial attempt to make a comparative examination of family relationships on a scientific basis. In addition to the regular research work of the Modern Section, lectures have been given on:—"The Icelandic Family" by Miss D. Torr, "The Modern Family" by Mr. F. J. Flugel, "Some Psychological Characteristics of Pacifist Literature" by Miss B. L. Hutchins, and "The Serbian Family" by Miss Zicaliotti, Mr. Shand being in the chair on each occasion.

CONFERENCE.

IN accordance with proposals brought before the Council, the Deputy-Chairman and the Secretary of the Society paid two visits to Oxford during the winter with a view to ascertaining how far those interested there in the study of the social sciences would be inclined to co-operate with the work of the Society in London. The suggestion of some form of co-operation was well received, and the further proposal that a Conference might be held in Oxford in October, 1922, on "The Correlation of the Social Sciences" has had hearty support, not only at Oxford, but from friends and members of the Society in other Universities.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

LIBRARY.

THE Library at Leplay House has been increasingly used during the past year. Gifts of books are much needed, if it is to be kept up to the standard requisite for the readers and students now using it.

SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (as was stated in the last Annual Report) is now managed by a Co-operative Society—Sociological Publications Limited. Arrangements for distribution of the REVIEW, as well as for printing and publication, are in the hands of this Society, and the new undertaking appears to be prospering.

MEMBERSHIP.

THE total number of members and associates now on the books of the Society is 265. Of these 19 members and 4 associates have joined since the last Annual Report was issued. The small membership is partly due to the fact that a considerable number of members had lapsed from regular subscription during the war, but had never intimated their resignations. At the beginning of this year, the names of those who had failed to pay their subscriptions for several years were removed from the books of the Society.

COUNCIL.

AT the last Annual General Meeting of the Society it was agreed that Rule 7 of the Constitution, limiting the number of ordinary members of Council to 30, should be altered, and the following amendment was adopted:—

“THE Council shall consist of its honorary officers and not more than 40 ordinary members. Of these ordinary members 30 shall be elected at the Annual General Meeting of the Society, and any number up to 10 in all be co-opted by the Council itself at its first meeting after the Annual General Meeting, or at any subsequent meeting. All members of Council shall be eligible for re-election. The Council shall make such regulations as may be necessary for the transaction of its own business.”

IN accordance with this amended Rule the Council of the Society for the past year has consisted of the following members:—

ELECTED MEMBERS.

Dr. W. R. Bisschop.	Dr. A. C. Haddon.	Dr. C. W. Saleeby.
Mr. Victor Branford.	Mr. J. A. Hobson.	The Rt. Hon. The Earl of
Mrs. Branford.	Prof. Hobhouse.	Sandwich.
Mr. F. C. Channing.	Dr. E. Hudson.	Mr. S. H. Swinny.
*Alderman A. E. Davies.	Mr. P. Hughesdon.	Mr. R. H. Tawney.
Mr. A. Farquharson.	Miss B. L. Hutchins.	Mr. Raymond Unwin.
Rev. Dr. Garvie.	Sir W. Leslie Mackenzie.	Prof. E. J. Urwick.
Prof. Geddes.	*Capt. J. Hume Menzies.	Prof. Graham Wallas.
Mr. Morris Ginsberg.	Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe.	Mr. R. Wellbye.
Mr. G. P. Gooch.	Mr. C. H. Rigg.	Mr. J. Martin White.
		Sir Francis Younghusband.

CO-OPTED MEMBERS.

Dr. MacDougall.	Mr. Holman.
Professor Fleure.	Miss Scatcherd.
Mr. J. Stobart Greenhalgh.	

THE Council has held four meetings in the course of the year. We are glad to be able to record that Mr. Victor Branford, the Chairman of the Council, has now recovered from his long illness and has been able to take an active part in the work of the Society during the past winter.

NOTE.—(*) Resigned during the year.

IN conclusion, the Council would emphasise the urgency and importance of the work of the Sociological Society. The need for its work has never been more obvious than at the present time. The complexity of social problems in every country in the world to-day, and the general failure to meet them with any solution based on scientific principles, proves the need for a scientific study of society. Moreover, a unanimous desire is now expressed by those concerned with the teaching of the Social Sciences, that these shall no longer be regarded as independent specialisms but that a new method shall be adopted in accordance with which they may be regarded as correlated parts of a larger field of thought and of experiment.

UNDER these circumstances the Council feels there is no need to stress the importance of the work that lies before the Sociological Society. But it does most earnestly appeal to all members and associates to assist loyally in carrying out its heavy responsibilities.

RECENT DISCUSSIONS.

ON May 8th Miss B. L. Hutchins read a paper on SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PACIFIST LITERATURE.

AFTER premising that the word "pacifism" was used in the paper in a wide sense, signifying an ideal beyond patriotism (as in the saying of Nurse Cavell, "Patriotism is not enough") the opener pointed out that on the plane of politics pacifism is a protest against nationalism or militarism, or, from the evolutionary standpoint, pacifism might be described as a strongly marked variety within a community, the special characteristic of pacifists being that they do not react to the herd instinct in war time in the pronounced way that most people do. In most belligerent countries during the war a group was observed of persons who stood outside the wave of patriotic excitement and occupied themselves in trying to understand the enemy point of view, in trying to get attention for that view, in trying to stem the tide of fury against enemy outrages, etc. Pacifists were observed to fall into at least two categories: one might be described as the "enraged pacifists," persons who identified themselves so strongly with the rehabilitation of the enemy that their views, by a curious irony, tended towards those, not of the pacifist on the opposite side, but even of the militarist. Instances could be found in the writings of, *e.g.*, the author of "J'ACCUSE" and Stilgebauer on the German side, Monsieur Pevet on the French. Another type of pacifist seeks to be wholly impartial, as, *e.g.*, Rolland, Dupin and others among the French, Nicolai, Stefan Zweig, and others among the Germans.

THE significance of pacifism (or "beyond patriotism") would seem to be that a means is needed whereby to reconcile the conflict of the old group loyalties, to harmonise the narrow particularism of the national group in a wider synthesis. This wider synthesis cannot be reached through rational argument only, the pacifist's function is to set up a new myth, a new centre around which emotion and enthusiasm can gather.

THERE is still ample scope for patriotism in the fields of art, culture, education, etc.; but on the plane of politics the old nationalism tends to become a disintegrating force. In the evolutionary sense, just as patriotism in the past has been a manifestation of the instinct of national self-preservation, so now pacifism is a manifestation of the instinct of human self-preservation.

REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY, by
R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess. The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1921. \$4.50 net.)

THE latest contribution to sociology, in America, is a little volume of some thousand pages. Ever since Carey published his *PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE* in 1858, bulky treatises on this subject have appeared with almost astronomical regularity every decade; and yet, for all the insight that sociology gives into the movement of events, or the life that goes on about us, this science might just as well have died with the great generation that produced Comte, Carey, Le Play, and Spencer. The intellectual advances recorded in Messrs. Park and Burgess' terrifying volume—and not to be found among the classic sociologists—prove in the main to be advances in such specific sciences as genetics and psychology; and not in sociology proper.

OUR periodical spring torrents of sociological thought apparently seep into the soil and leave not a trace. The life of the American community is as arid and disordered and incomplete as if the science of sociology did not exist; and if one wished for any guidance in either intellectual research or in social practice—with one or two notable exceptions like that of Professor Galpin in rural sociology—there is more pith in Plato than in the latest dissertation by a Ph.D. It is no paradox to say that there is greater danger to the science of sociology by its current exercise in America, where it is taught in a hundred lecture halls, than there is in Great Britain, where it is neglected, both in name and in content, in every great university but London. Sociology can scarcely be expected to survive this diabetic flatulence of sociologies; and if the science is ever to be intellectually respectable in its own right, or of any service in the business of social engineering, it is about time that a drastic examination were made of the patient, and a different regimen prescribed.

THE BOOK that is under examination is about as good and as bad as any that has appeared during the last decade. With little pretence to originality, the text makes no effort to sap away credit that belongs to other social scientists; and while it neglects some of the leading sociological thinkers of recent years in Great Britain and France—I mean particularly Professor Patrick Geddes, the founder of the world's first sociological laboratory and the initiator of the Social Survey, and Edmond Demolins—it gives a pretty good account of the recent literature. At once an original text and a source-book, this Introduction throws a wide cone of light over the whole field of sociological investigation. How is this field organized? How is it that an Introduction to Sociology is so far from being an induction into the organization and life-habits of human societies? A glance at the manner in which their sociological material has been classified by Messrs. Park and Burgess will help us in formulating an answer.

WE begin with a commentary upon sociology and the social sciences. There follow chapters on human nature and society and the group; and on their heels come isolation, social contacts, social inter-actions, social forces, competition, conflict, accommodation, assimilation, social control, collective behaviour, and progress. Underlying this treatment of sociology is the fundamental assumption that the unit of investigation is the human species at large. It is for this reason that most of the modern treatises on sociology,

which are not merely eloquent jumbles of primitive anthropology and charity organization statistics, are in reality textbooks on social psychology—a distinct science with claims and prerogatives of its own. There would be no quarrel with this method were it not for the fact that the units under investigation are not things but concepts; and the examination and classification of concepts, without perpetual reference to the data from which they are derived, is scholasticism rather than science. The familiarity of sociological terms and the apparent immediacy of the phenomena that sociology investigates has concealed for the most part the fact that the science is a vast and entertaining logomachy. These are admittedly harsh words; and it is time, therefore, to suggest what might be done in order to avoid them.

A LUCID introduction to sociology, it seems to me, would begin with the definite, tangible, observable human societies—the 1,500,000 separate ones that are listed in the Postal Directory, for example—in which man is always found, with such exceptions as feral beings who have lost their specifically human characteristics. Before the student learned a single word about “isolation,” “conflict,” “accommodation,” and the rest of it he would be given an insight into the basic structure, material and ideologic, of these severally different societies. The student would cease to think of such vague abstractions as humanity, the people, the proletariat, the crowd, the bourgeoisie, or what not: he would figure definite groups of people doing specific kinds of work within a certain more or less restricted environment. The focus of the student’s investigation would not be sociological concepts but the living tissue of a real community.

OUR chief demand of sociology, then, is that it should study the ecology of the human community; in other words, that it should be able to describe the conditions—geographic, biologic, and psychic—under which various kinds of people with sundry potentialities shall be able to function most freely and actively. The botanist who studies the ecology of plants can describe minutely the chemical composition of the soil, the kind of climate, and the types of accessory fauna and flora under which a beech forest, say, will flourish; and he points out with no hesitation than when other conditions prevail chestnut or ash or pine scrub will take the place of the beech. So a sociologist who had available a sufficient number of studies in definite human communities would be able to tell—on the basis of an impartial, factual inquiry—what new elements would be needed before the people of a particular community would be adjusted adequately to their environment and able to react creatively upon it. Doubtless a great deal of investigation that now comes under the head of sociology would enter into this survey; but for the present this material lacks point and coherence; and until sociology reorients itself towards definite human communities—following Le Play and the sociologists of the Edinburgh school—our annual textbooks of sociology, with their vague conspectuses of human society, so called—will hardly help us to deal any more with the concrete problems of the day than would the *World’s Almanac*.

In the meanwhile, what is to be done? Sociology in the American sense—a chaotic, amorphous, invertebrate, nebulous body of observations and reflections—is now a vested interest which will continue to be cultivated with as much assiduity as was mediæval logic in eighteenth century Oxford; and he who hopes otherwise does not perceive that a vested interest has nine lives. The only genuine hope for sociology, as far as I can see, is that the human geographers, following on the trail of Herbertson, Geddes, Vidal de la Blache, and others, will push their accurate methods of observation beyond the hydrosphere, lithosphere and atmosphere into the regions

that they themselves have already dubbed the sociosphere and the psychosphere. They will draw from current sociology the material they need to deepen their analyses and enlarge their syntheses; and they will trust to a kindly providence to dispose of that sociological débris which, in a current cliché, concerns neither science nor society.

THERE is, perhaps, a large residuum of human actions which, as Messrs. Park and Burgess point out, will never be the subject of forecast and anticipatory adjustment. As sociology progresses we shall be able to isolate that residuum; and we shall not talk glibly about it in University lecture halls in the belief that we are contributing the illuminations of science to the daily conduct of affairs. In that far day, our sociologies will be smaller in bulk, but they will show a greater clarity of design; and on the basis of their descriptions we may—who knows?—superimpose our plans for a New Jerusalem.

LEWIS MUMFORD.

A CONSTITUTION FOR THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH
OF GREAT BRITAIN, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Longmans
and Co.

FOR thirty years Mr. and Mrs. Webb have been studying British social democracy in action, from the standpoints both of History and Economics. From Trade Unionism they have passed to Co-operation and Local Government, and thence again to the State. Their work in all these fields has added lustre to British scholarship and won for them deserved pre-eminence in the ranks of sociologists. Now, in a volume which is admirable alike for form and content, they have gathered up the threads of these enquiries and woven them into a coherent whole.

THEIR new book might be regarded as a commentary on a striking paragraph in Maxime Leroy's *POUR GOUVERNER*. "Dans une Démocratie," he writes, "le Gouvernement est partout où il y a des groupes d'hommes qui pensent et agissent autour d'une grande idée technique ou économique, morale ou politique." The primary aim of their book is to insist that democratic government is impossible so long as we continue to think of "the individual citizen as a human being, having at all times and seasons . . . an identical complex of desires and purposes." And if we wish—as do the authors—to apply the democratic principle to industry, and substitute social control for what they call "the Dictatorship of the Capitalist," the necessity for the recognition of this truth becomes even more apparent. Once this is admitted it becomes clear that men must be considered and represented in at least three aspects—as producers, as consumers, and as citizens—and this in turn involves the recognition as indispensable instruments of industrial government of a diversity of associations, national and local, compulsory and voluntary, professional and universal.

THE general case here summarised may be regarded as proved. The increasing inadequacy of Parliament for the multifarious tasks imposed upon it; the helplessness of the isolated consumer before the assaults of the Trusts; the necessity for securing the workers' good-will by admitting him to at least a share of control in industry—these have become common-places. But in what ways can this social federalism best find institutional expression? Mr. and Mrs. Webb have worked out their answer with a wealth of detail which renders its description, much more its adequate criticism, impossible. A few points only can be mentioned.

In the first place, the present reviewer feels himself not quite convinced of the necessity for the Social Parliament—to which the representation of national interests in economic affairs is to be entrusted—being organised on a territorial or neighbourhood basis. Is it not at least possible that the National Joint Industrial Council might develop, after the British fashion, into an assembly which would, in fact, be more representative than the new institution suggested? To turn to Local Government. That the authors' plan for its reconstruction would be an improvement on the existing costly anarchy there can be no doubt, but in considering this problem of administrative areas, have they given sufficient attention to its geographical aspect? Might they not with advantage have secured the friendly criticism of such authorities as Professors Fleure and Fawcett?

BUT this review must not end on a critical note. The authors have rendered a valuable service to Political Science by this book; it will be matter for surprise if practical politicians—Socialists and non-Socialists—are not speedily found quarrying ideas from it for legislative schemes. Finally, if any reader of the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW* still cherishes the absurd illusion that Mr. and Mrs. Webb are rigid Collectivists, perpetually scheming to deliver us all into the maw of that "cold monster," the State—let him read this book and be undeceived for ever.

SYDNEY HERBERT.

ARABIC THOUGHT AND ITS PLACE IN HISTORY, by De Lacy O'Leary, D.D. Trubners Oriental Series. Kegan Paul. pp. 320: (10s. 6d.)

ALTHOUGH many books have been written, from the time of Jourdain and Wenrich to Horten and Duhem at the present day, on the romantic history of the transmission of Greek thought by the Syrians to the Arabs, and by these, again, to the Jews and the Christians of the West, this book is, so far as I know, the first attempt in English to give a general survey of the whole process. It should be of interest not only to the professed student of philosophy, but to the historian and even to the sociologist, for the author views his subject broadly, as the most remarkable instance of "culture drift" that is known to us in detail. He shows how this movement is to be traced not only among the philosophers, but also among the theologians, the lawyers and the mystics of Islam, so that the Moslem culture which exercised such an influence on 13th century Europe "was at bottom essentially a part of the Hellenistic-Roman material," a heritage of the same culture which had also given birth to the civilization of western Christendom. Strictly speaking the share of the Arabs in this story is small enough. During the first period Greek science was represented by the Syriac Christians and the pagans of Harran. During the second period the golden age of Moslem thought—the great thinkers with the exception of Al Kindi were Persians and men from the marches of Turkestan. Finally in the twelfth century, the task was taken up by the Moslems of the West—of Spain and Morocco, and by them handed on to the Jews and the Christians. MOREOVER, as Dr. O'Leary shows, the whole movement found little favour with the orthodox Moslem. First the Mu'tazilites who attempted to apply Hellenistic science to theology, and afterwards the Falasifa, or philosophers proper, were laid under the ban of orthodoxy. The attempt of Averroes to go behind the Neoplatonic commentators and rediscover the true Aristotle, was entirely without influence in the Islamic world, in spite of its importance for mediæval Europe. In its last stage Arabic philosophy lingered on among the Jews and in the universities of North East Italy, where Dr.

O'Leary considers that it played an important part in preparing the way for the Renaissance. "The pro-Arabic element in scholastic days was the direct parent of the philopagan element in the renaissance, at least in Southern Europe." This was the aspect of Arabic philosophy which interested Renan, and which he studied at length in his well-known book on Averroes. It was not, however, the most important result of Arabic thought. "Its richest fruits," Dr. O'Leary says, "must be sought in side issues, in the scholasticism which in Islam, in Judaism and in Christianity, was a reaction from its teaching and in the mediæval, chemical and other scientific studies of the Middle Ages" (above all surely astronomy and mathematics) "which largely owed their inspiration to its influence."

The value of the book as a manual for students is impaired by the complete absence of indices and bibliography, and the paucity of references. There is, however, a useful chronological table (24 pages) from 632 to 1268 A.D.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON.

THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE, by Edward Westermarck.
5th Edition, rewritten. Macmillan, London, 1921. (3 vols., £4 4s.
net.)

THE monumental work of Professor Westermarck has now reached its Fifth Edition, a signal mark of the value of the book to all students of human society. It is not necessary to give a detailed account of the work, for it remains unaltered in its chief features, and it will probably go down to history as one of the best of a long series of works that tried to explain the detailed and intricate customs of men on the basis of a prolonged process of evolution. In these days of the "Primal Horde," and the many theories derived thence, it is refreshing to find Professor Westermarck marshalling evidence to show the utter falsity of this position, and his emphatic demonstration of the priority of monogamy and the family. Professor Westermarck has stuck to his guns over Exogamy, in spite of the numerous criticisms that his views have evoked. He still maintains that the instinctive aversion from sexual unions between those brought up in close association can account for the exogamous rule, in which, in its earliest forms, the community is bisected and marriage takes place between the moieties. He has hard work to explain how the aversion extends to those who are sometimes unknown, but are members of the same moiety, and his explanation is unconvincing.

In his opening chapter Professor Westermarck defends his comparative method, and criticises those of Rivers, Durkheim, Graebner and others. Some of Professor Westermarck's arguments hardly carry conviction. For instance, he does not like the contentions of Dr. Rivers (whose tragic and untimely death we all deplore and mourn) that the psychological interpretation of custom is the most difficult task of the ethnologist, and that this task can only hopefully be undertaken after much descriptive work has been accomplished. To anyone who has tried to understand the meaning of custom without the use of the current catch-phrases, the arguments of Rivers are conclusive, and it is amazing to find that the author of a scientific work should comment thus: "For the present, then, we should, on this principle, carefully refrain from assuming, for example, that courtship and marriage have anything to do with the sexual instinct . . ." Parody of the views of someone from whom one differs is not serious argument, and cannot be treated as such. Professor Westermarck may "find it truly alarming to hear from one who may almost be regarded as the leader of a new school in sociology in this country that social phenomena should be

referred to social antecedents before any attempt is made to examine the psychological processes underlying them"; but certainly this is one of the soundest methodological rules ever laid down, and one which would have preserved many ethnologists and sociologists from the perpetration of much nonsense.

W. J. PERRY.

GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY, by C. Delisle Burns. Allen and Unwin, London. (16s. net.)

THE main part of this book is a survey of the activities at present exercised by the State in the economic sphere; and the author claims that "it is a study of actual practice with a view to discovering fundamental principles, and it is not a statement of an ideal nor propaganda for a policy." His examination, however, leads him, perhaps more willingly than the facts demand, to the conclusion that the only logical theory which can be discovered in the attempts of the State to intervene in our industrial system, must lead in time to that organisation of economic life made familiar to us by the Guild Socialists. The book is a useful summary of the actual position of the relations between Government and Industry, but it is sometimes distressingly vague in stating the problems; no good purpose can be served by the argument for a State banking system contained on p. 163 that "the tendency to a financial monopoly (caused by Bank amalgamations) means that the credit obtainable for industry is given at a rate which can be dictated by a group, if that group has no rivals." Remarks of this kind unsupported by evidence are unconvincing, and far more detailed treatment is needed if they are to be justified. Unfortunately this is a typical example of a good deal of the argument in the book. Mr. Burns is anxious to illustrate the growth of Governmental as opposed to private activities by the cases of the army, navy, and administration of justice which, he says, "were all once instances of private enterprise . . . and were all once run with a view mainly to the private gain of those who ran them." But all these were recognised functions of the State at a very early date, and cases of corruption do not destroy their specifically political nature. Indeed, Mr. Burns elsewhere presses the distinction between the economic and the political aims of the community, which is, of course, essential to his argument for the devolution of the former to functional bodies. His treatment of this subject, and his conclusions regarding the general tendency towards a new conception of economic organisation, both of which are to be found in the last chapter, are certainly the most interesting part of the book. Mr. Burns, in fact, is far more successful in dealing with the general than with the particular, and a symptom of this is perhaps his contempt for the efforts of the orthodox economists.

J. DE L. M.

SUCCESS, by the Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook. Stanley, Paul & Co., 1922. (2s. 6d. net.)

It is a pity that this book does not contain more of autobiography and less of wide general statements. There are interesting glimpses of the writer's personality—that is all. "When I was a boy I knew the value in exchange of every marble in my village." "If the young man hears these 'ancestral voices prophesying war' and shivers a little in his bed at night, he will be none the worse for the cold douche of doubt and enmity." "A man must

feel those early deals right down in the pit of his stomach if he is going to be a great man of business." Yes, a really frank autobiography from Lord Beaverbrook would be very illuminating.

THE standpoint of the writer is clearly postulated at the outset. "For my own part I speak of the only field of success I know—the world of ordinary affairs." This is rather crowding the critics into a corner. Have they not a night to demand, in return, that Lord Beaverbrook call his book "Success in Business"? For the whole gospel is simply a call to profit-hunting and deals with success in no other direction whatever. "I am talking to the young men who want to succeed in business and to build up a new nation. Criticism based on any other conception of my purpose is a spent shaft," says Lord Beaverbrook.

"To build up a new nation," however, is an object which sociologists and Lord Beaverbrook's successful young men will have in common. "Succeed young, and retire as young as you can," is the slogan; then "Art, or Letters or Public Service" are to engage a complacent middle-age. Those early years are to be full of strife of the most ferociously competitive type. In the world of business "... men fight with a precipice behind them, not a pension of £2,000 a year," states Lord Beaverbrook severely, when assuring politicians of their inferiority to business men. The argument seems to be that because the conditions are more remorseless the combatants are necessarily better in quality, *i.e.*, the best man will choose the struggle of business, the weaker ones the struggle of politics. Lord Beaverbrook's real reason for thinking this is one of the many engaging mysteries which arise from a study of this book.

HOWEVER, the precipice shunned and the heat of the combat left behind, Lord Beaverbrook's successful young man enters the state described in the last chapter as "Calm." This twilight of satisfied retrospect is not to be without activities. "Politics, journalism, the management of Commissions or charitable organisations, all require much the same kind of aptitudes and draw on the same kind of experiences which are acquired by the successful man of affairs. The difference is that they are not so arduous, because they are rarely a matter of life and death to any man—certainly can never be so to a man with an assured income." Professional journalists battling in the overcrowded lists of the newspaper world will receive this opinion from the proprietor of a large newspaper with considerable interest: they will also have their own views upon the man with an assured income who can afford to play with the issues upon which depend their own bread-and-butter. Politicians have already been dismissed as an inferior breed.

LET us suppose, however, that the successful young man turns to the "management of Commissions or charitable organisations." With what equipment? A mind prepared by successful and early escape from life and death struggle in the world of business. Lord Beaverbrook presumably offers us this book in evidence of the product of such a training. True, the volume is stated to be a collection of articles, originally published in the *Sunday Express* and has every appearance of being merely a string of thoughts discharged at a secretary in odd half-hours of a busy man's routine life; though even so a number of the thoughts would seem to be carefully memorised phrases which have occurred to Lord Beaverbrook at various times and places. What is the impression given by the book?

FRANKLY, that of a philosophy partly of tags, partly of somewhat clumsy attempts at originality. We are informed that Lord Beaverbrook's apathy with regard to formal education for his boys horrified the Lord Chancellor. His own education is described as follows: "It was the seasons which

decided my compulsory education. In the winter I attended school because it was warm inside and in the summer I spent my time in the woods because it was warm outside." Then comes the instance of Mr. J. L. Garvin as a self-educated man formed by wide reading. "Experience teaches that no man ought to be downcast in setting out on the adventure of life by a lack of formal knowledge," is the conclusion. "When all is said and done, the real education is the market-place of the street. There the study of character enables the boy of judgment to develop an unholy proficiency in estimating the value of the currency of the realm." But what of the sciences? Lord Beaverbrook's education might easily produce a successful business man: but it would be very unlikely to produce a great scientist. Modern society is built up on modern scientific knowledge. Specialisation in knowledge and research leaves little room for Lord Beaverbrook's fortune-making activities in early life. Lord Beaverbrook's own career has been made possible by his continual use of the everyday applications of scientific research in almost numberless directions. The spirit of scientific research is that of doing the work for its own sake, demanding only very modest rewards from society in return for vast services rendered. "Formal knowledge" is absolutely essential and must be carefully acquired before the modern scientist adventures in any direction upon progress for himself. Careful training and close thinking are becoming every year more and more essential in our control of nature, in the conduct of all human activities. Business itself is becoming extremely scientific and specialised. Production is rooted deep in scientific knowledge—production as apart from financial manipulations of shares and companies

BUT isn't there a hint of a wink in the left eye of the portrait of Lord Beaverbrook published on the jacket of "Success"? We should be much more interested in that autobiography.

DONALD HOLMAN.

AN INTRODUCTION TO MYTHOLOGY, by Lewis Spence. Harrap, London, 1921. (12s. 6d. net.)

THIS manual will be found of value by students who wish to gain an acquaintance with the position of the science of mythology to-day and to know something of how it has developed. In the first place a summary of the growth of the science and the work of the chief scholars who have taken part in this is given. Later chapters show the evolution of the types of deity worshipped by various peoples under different conditions; different classes of myth are dealt with, and there is a chapter on folk-lore and ritual in relation to myth, and another on mythic systems. Particulars of the written sources to which the student of myth must go are also given. We have only space here for a sentence or two of criticism from the Sociological point of view. The author does not suggest that modern civilised nations have a mythology of their own—religious, political, and economic; yet this is surely one of the chief uses of the study of the mythology of simpler and more primitive people, viz., that it gives a means of comparing and judging of these modern myths scientifically, with most important bearings on our civilisation and its reconstruction. Again it would be interesting to have a classification of myths in which their relation to social phenomena was more clearly brought out; for example, how far the myths of any people owe their origin to the economic life imposed on them by natural conditions; how far the conception of the individual life as passing through a regular series of stages marked by tragedy and comedy finds embodiment in mythology; and so on. At the same time it is only fair to say that Mr. Spence's book contains a great deal of valuable and well arranged information.

A. F.

PSYCHANALYSIS IN THE CLASS ROOM, by G. H. Green, B.Sc.
(London), B.Litt. (Oxon). University of London Press, 1921. (7s. 6d.
net.)

THIS book makes an appeal to both students and practical people of various types. It has something of value for all teachers and theorists on education as well as for all workers who deal with children. It is not without significance for students of literature and art and for scientific psychologists.

IN the day dreams of children recorded here, and his analysis of these, Mr. Green has done first hand work, and has provided an approach to psycho-analysis which is of the utmost value. In what he says about the relation of day dreams other activities he brings out the value of such studies for education. His section on the causes of slips, accidents, etc., bears upon many school problems and should impress every teacher. He also adds a comprehensive annotated Bibliography which is of great service.

THE relation of the subject to sociology and civics may be shortly considered. For the sociologist Mr. Green has new light to shed on the whole field of material and immaterial culture. Many expressions of social life which the sociologist studies now appear either as day dreams or the projection of day dreams; and the influence of these upon politics and religion are matters of primary interest. On the civic side the book may be of practical use in the class room by giving an impetus in the way of adaptation of school activities to the individual, and later of the re-organisation of industrial and other activities to meet psychical needs.

A. F.

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